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ABSTRACT
Research documents that insiders, who have access to private information, appear 
to trade with profits before major corporate events like mergers, bankruptcy, dividend 
announcements, and future cash flow news (see, e.g., Seyhun, 1990; Seyhun and Bradley, 
1997; John and Lang, 1991; Jiang and Zaman, 2010). Another recent stream of studies 
find that the size and quality of a firm’s patent portfolio are positively related to the 
firm’s future stock returns (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2012; Pandit, Wasley, and Zach, 
2011). However, there is little systematic evidence on whether insiders act 
opportunistically when they possess private information about the firm’s patent portfolio.
In this dissertation, I empirically investigate insiders’ trading and option grants 
throughout the different phases of an influential patent’s application. An influential patent 
is defined as a patent with high citation impact. Chapter One focuses on insiders’ open 
market transactions before the filing year of an influential patent, while Chapter Two 
centers on informed executive stock option (ESO) exercises and unscheduled option 
awards before two milestone dates of an influential patent: the application date and the 
grant date.
In Chapter One, I examine the pattern of insider trading before the filing year of 
an influential patent, for a sample of 2,470 firm-years from 1987 to 2006. In regressions 
of three insider trading measures controlling for factors related to insider trading, I find 
that the level of insiders’ net purchases is consistently and significantly higher in the year
before filing an influential patent than in the application year. The abnormal higher level 
in net purchases is not from active insider trading -  insiders increasing their purchases 
above normal levels, but from passive insider trading -  insiders reducing their sales 
below normal levels in the year before filing an influential patent. In contrast, there is no 
such insider trading pattern for the industry-size matched firms. There is also no 
abnormal insider trading before the filing of an inconsequential patent.
Chapter Two studies whether executives’ ESO exercises and options grants are 
related to superior information about the quality of a firm’s patents, for a sample of 654 
firm-events with an influential patent filed from 1996 to 2006. Using difference-in- 
differences (DID) regressions of two measures of option exercises, I find that executives 
significantly delay exercising their stock options by reducing option exercises in the year 
prior to the filing date of an influential patent and increasing option exercises in the year 
after that. In contrast, no such pattern of informed option exercises is found in the 
industry-size-performance matched control firms.
From the DID regression of the measure of option grants, I find no evidence of 
abnormal option grants around the application date of an influential patent. However, I 
find that executives receive more unscheduled stock options in the one-year period before 
the grant date of an influential patent than after that. In contrast, the matched control 
firms award fewer unscheduled stock options before a non-influential patent is granted 
than after that. My findings show that in addition to exercising options opportunistically, 
influencing the timing of unscheduled option grants is another channel through which 
insiders can pursue personal interests by exploiting the information advantages related to 
the quality of a patent. Moreover, I provide evidence that insiders possess private
information throughout the lengthy application process, from the filing to the grant of 
influential patent.
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CHAPTER ONE
INSIDER TRADING AROUND THE FILING OF 
INFLUENTIAL PATENTS
Introduction
This study attempts to answer whether insiders can profit from their knowledge 
on firms’ innovation outputs by empirically examining the insider trading before the 
filing of an influential patent measured by a high future citation count. A patent is one of 
the most important measures of a firm’s innovation outputs (Griliches, 1990). In fact, 
several recent studies find that the size and quality of a firm’s patent portfolio are 
positively related to the firm’s future stock returns (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2012; 
Pandit, Wasley, and Zach, 2011). Therefore, one might wonder whether insiders trade 
opportunistically when they possess private information about the firm’s patents.
To answer the question, I investigate the insider trading before the filing of an 
influential patent for two reasons. First, I focus on the insiders’ open market transactions 
in the year before an influential patent being filed, as the insiders’ information advantages 
over the public may have been greater in the year before a patent being filed. A firm’s 
innovation activities are highly uncertain. The year before a patent being filed is the time 
in which the future of an innovation is fully revealed to the insiders, as the firm is 
preparing the documents of the imminent patent application after an early stage of R&D 
(Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005).
On average, it takes two years for a patent application to be granted (Hall, JafFe, 
and Trajtenberg, 2001). Most firms prefer to keep the knowledge of innovation 
confidential until the patent is granted since the public disclosure of the patent application 
is not required (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005). Therefore, for several years starting from 
the year before the filing of a patent, only insiders have intimate knowledge of the 
pending patent application and of the potential economic impact of the patent. This 
private information provides a tempting opportunity to corporate insiders for personal 
gains by engaging in insider trading.
Secondly, I focus on influential patents since it is well known that the significance 
or value of each individual patent varies widely. A few patents with good quality are 
extremely valuable, while many others are worth comparatively little (Pakes and 
Schankerman, 1984) among a very large number of patents granted in U.S. -  according to 
the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), over 150,000 patents are granted every 
year (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001). Information about a firm’s innovation is hard to 
be evaluated by outsiders since doing so requires knowledge of the expertise and of 
future changes in the development of a firm and/or its industry. Most outside investors 
would have difficulty in estimating the economic implications of an innovation, even 
when the patent is granted with detailed technical information available to the public. 
Before the filing of a patent, it would be almost impossible for outsiders to distinguish an 
influential patent from a less significant or incremental technological discovery and then 
correctly value the economic implications of a patent. Corporate insiders, who observe 
the developing process of an innovation from the very beginning and possess large 
amounts of private information, may have a stronger notion of a patent’s ultimate
importance at the very beginning. Therefore, corporate insiders with private information 
may engage in profitable trading opportunistically since they are better at identifying an 
influential patent with higher future impact than outsiders before the patent is filed.
An influential patent is defined as a patent with high citation impact in this study. 
Trajtenberg (1990) argues that the number of citations received by a patent is a better 
measure of innovation quality than the number of patents a firm owns. When granted, a 
patent is required to cite all previous patents upon which this new technology builds. 
Accordingly, an influential patent can represent a platform on which future innovations 
will be based and is expected to receive more citations in the future. Several studies have 
shown that a patent’s citations contain valuation-relevant information and may be used as 
an accurate measure of the value of a patent (see, e.g. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; 
Gu, 2005; Matolcsy and Wyatt, 2008; McGahee, 2011; Pandit, Wasley, and Zach, 2011). 
Following these studies, I measure the impact of a patent using the total adjusted citations 
received by the patent. Specifically, I define an influential patent as one that is ranked in 
the top ten-percent most cited patents of the application year in its technology sub­
category based on three-digit patent classes from the USPTO classification.
Using patent data compiled from patents filings to the USPTO by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), I analyze insiders’ open market transactions 
during the calendar year before (‘informed’ period) and the calendar year (control period) 
that a patent is filed for a sample of “influential patent” firms and two control samples. 
There are 2,470 firm-years, in which 3,538 influential patents were filed during the 
period 1987-2006. The two control samples are an industry-size matched sample in
which no influential patent was filed and a sample of “inconsequential patent” firms in 
which patents were ranked in the bottom ten-percent cited patents of the application year.
Before analyzing insider trading, I present two pieces of evidence that an 
influential patent is positively associated with the filing firm’s future stock performances. 
First, I find that the market reacts more favorably when an influential patent is granted by 
USPTO than when an inconsequential patent is granted. The cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) of the filing firm when an influential patent is granted are largely positive and 
significantly higher than those of the filing firm when an inconsequential patent is 
granted. For example, the average CARs over days (-5, 5) around a patent grant date is 
0.95% (significant) for an influential patent, and significantly higher than that for an 
inconsequential patent at -0.05% (insignificant). Secondly, I find that the sample firms 
with influential patents have better stock performances in three years after filing patents 
applications than firms in two control samples, as the post-application long-run abnormal 
returns (adjusted by the Fama-French three-factor model) for the sample firms of 
influential patents are significantly higher.
I next examine the open-market stock transactions of three groups of corporate 
insiders: all insiders, top management, and all insiders except for large blockholders. 
Following Agrawal and Nasser (2012), I investigate purchases, sales, and net purchases 
of insiders, using three measures of the level of insider trading.
In regressions of three insider trading measures controlling for factors related to 
insider trading, I find that the level of insiders’ net purchases is consistently and 
significantly higher in the year before filing an influential patent than the application 
year. The abnormal higher level in net purchases is not from active insider trading,
insiders increasing their purchases above normal levels, but from passive insider trading, 
insiders reducing their sales below normal levels in the year before filing an influential 
patent. In contrast, there is no such insider trading pattern in the industry-size matched 
sample and no abnormal insider trading before the filing of an inconsequential patent. 
This pattern holds for each insider group. This pattern of passive trading by insiders the 
year before the filing of an influential patent is similar to the passive trading by target 
firms’ insiders before takeover announcements as documented by Agrawal and Nasser 
(2012).
By examining the insider trading before the filing of an influential patent 
measured by high future citation impact, I add to the extensive research that has focused 
on insider trading activities prior to major corporate events like mergers, stock 
repurchases, seasoned equity offerings, earnings announcements, dividend 
announcements, and bankruptcy filings (see, e.g., Agrawal and Nasser, 2012; Raad and 
Wu, 1995; Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994; John and Lang, 1991; 
Seyhun and Bradley, 1997, respectively). Those studies provide evidences that insiders 
appear to trade profitably because of their access to private information that is not 
available to outside shareholders until the major events are publicly announced.
Despite the importance of patents that measure firms’ innovation outputs to firms’ 
future performance, there is little systematic evidence on whether insiders trade 
opportunistically when they possess private information on the firms’ patent portfolio. 
Few studies find evidences that insiders gain by trading on their private information 
related to research and development (R&D), a measure of innovation input (Aboody and 
Lev, 2000; Coff and Lee, 2003 ). In a closely related paper, Ahuja, Coff, and Lee (2005)
examine insider trading related to patents and find that managers purchase stock well 
before breakthrough patents are filed. My study differs from Ahuja, Coff, and Lee (2005) 
and adds to the literature in three aspects. In the first place, this paper provides evidence 
based on larger and more comprehensive sample, twenty years of patent data from 1987- 
2006, as opposed to three years of patents from 1988-1990 in Ahuja, Coff, and Lee 
(2005). In the second place, I define an influential patent by the citation rank in its own 
technology sub-category, based on the USPTO classification to account for the varying 
citation patterns of patents from different technology classes. Lastly, Ahuja, Coff, and 
Lee (2005) only examine values of stock purchases by insiders and find evidence of 
active insider trading; we, however, use three measures of insider trading and investigate 
purchases, sales, and net purchases to provide systematic evidences of a pattern of 
passive trading by insiders during the year before the filing of an influential patent.
Prior Studies on Insider Trading, Innovation, 
Patents, and Information Asymmetry
Do Insiders Gain Through Insider Trading?
Corporate insiders are defined by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
as “officers, directors, or owners of more than ten percent of total common stock 
outstanding”. Though most insiders’ trading is routine, legal, and conducted for liquidity 
reasons, previous studies show that insiders have predictive ability to earn abnormal 
returns from trading in the securities of their firms (Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff 
and Zaman, 1988). Managers seem to have an informational advantage on major 
corporate events several months ahead of a public announcement. Extensive studies 
indicate that insiders appear to trade with profits before bankruptcy (Seyhun and Bradley,
1997), dividend announcements (John and Lang, 1991), stock repurchases (Lee, 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1992; Raad and Wu, 1995), seasoned equity offerings (Karpoff 
and Lee, 1991; Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle, 2001), merger and takeover (Seyhun, 1990; 
Agrawal and Nasser, 2012), future cash flow news (Jiang and Zaman, 2010), accounting 
restatements (Agrawal and Cooper, 2008), and delayed goodwill impairments (Muller, 
Neamtiu, and Riedl, 2012).
The gains of insider trading stem from information asymmetries between 
investors and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), in which managers have access to 
nonpublic information of important strategic events. Generally, investors may view 
insider purchases as a signal of good news and insider sales as a signal of bad news. 
Previous studies find that private information can be implied from stock purchases, but 
not from stock sales (see, e.g., Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng, Metrick, 
and Zeckhauser, 2003). Agrawal and Nasser (2012) find that target firms’ insiders not 
only decrease their purchases before takeover announcements but that the insiders also 
reduce their sales even more, thus increasing their net purchases. Agrawal and Nasser 
(2012) define this pattern as “passive trading”. Their findings suggest that insider sales 
further imply important corporate information, and they argue regulations for insider 
trading are not effective in regulating the insider gains from sales, not as easily 
recognized as insider gains from purchases.
Innovation as a Source o f  Information Asymmetry
It is commonly recognized that technological innovation brings long-run 
economic benefits for firms (Griliches, 1984, 2000). However, information asymmetries 
are more severe in innovation-intensive firms. For example, Ciftci, Lev, and
Radhakrishnan (2011) find evidence that R&D-intensive firms which engage in basic 
research activities are likely to suffer from higher information asymmetry than firms that 
mimic and extend existing technologies. Generally, such innovation-intensive firms have 
a relatively large amount of intangible assets, utilize more resources for technology and 
innovation, and are more likely to have a fast changing technical environment. All these 
features make it hard for market participants to accurately value and estimate the firm’s 
future prospects. Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) suggest that investor dependence 
on analysts’ information is greater in R&D-intensive firms, while Gu (2005) and Ciftici 
(2012) find that market participants, including investors and analysts, do not fully value 
the implication of enhanced innovation capabilities and underestimate future earnings of 
R&D-intensive firms. Moreover, in innovation-intensive companies, normally the CEOs 
or top managers are engineers or experts in their field, which increases the difficulty for 
shareholders to monitor them since doing so requires the relevant technology knowledge. 
The less effective and less efficient monitoring mechanism for innovation-intensive 
firms, accordingly, provides the managers more opportunities to pursue their own 
interests. Insider trading could be a moderate channel for them through which to gain 
abnormal returns at the cost of outside investors.
Innovation, as an important source of information asymmetries and incentive of 
inside trading, has not been comprehensively investigated. Aboody and Lev (2000) point 
out that one potential source of insider gains through insider trading is research and 
development (R&D). They find that insider gains from insider trading in R&D-intensive 
firms are substantially larger than those in firms without R&D. Thus, R&D can be 
viewed as a major contributor to information asymmetry. Coff and Lee (2003) further
suggest that insider purchases have greater signaling value to investors in R&D firms and 
find evidence that insider purchases generate larger positive stock price reactions for 
R&D-intensive firms.
Patents, one of the most important indicators of innovative output, have been 
commonly used in the literature as a measure of firms’ technological progress. Gu 
(2005), Pandit, Wasley, and Zach (2011), and Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) show that 
firms with high-quality patents have better future operating/stock performances. Pandit, 
Wasley, and Zach (2011) measure a patent’s quality by the patent’s citations. Eisdorfer 
and Hsu (2011) report that technologically innovative firms are less likely to go bankrupt. 
Additionally, Hsu, Lee, Liu, and Zhang (2011) find that non-insider bondholders use the 
output of innovation, granted patents and associated citations, to evaluate the economic 
value of these innovations and to price the bonds of patent-owning firms accordingly. 
Therefore, patents seem to contain useful information in assessing the productivity of 
firms’ innovation and understanding the relation between innovation and financial 
performances.
However, patents have received much less attention in existing research as a 
source of information asymmetry and an incentive of insider trading. Using three years of 
patent data (1988-1990), Ahuja, Coff, and Lee (2005) posit that managers may use 
foresight on firms’ strategic assets to pursue private interests by engaging in insider 
trading and find that managers purchase stocks well before breakthrough patents are 
filed. Rong (2012) finds that effects of a firm’s insider trading patterns are significant in 
explaining the unexpected fluctuations in patent output with control for the effect of
R&D expenditures. That finding supports the argument that management has private 
information about a firm’s R&D productivity beyond what is known to outside investors.
Sample Selection and Data Description
Sample o f  “Influential Patent ” Firms
Several databases are used to construct the sample, including the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) patent data, Thomson Financial Insiders Filings database
(TFI), Compustat, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Patent-related
data are from the updated NBER patent database originally developed by Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg (2001) and revised as of August, 2010. The database includes detailed
information on all patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
during the period 1976 -  2006. Patent citations, the key indicator o f patent value, suffer
from a truncation bias since citations are generally received for years after the patent is
granted. The patents that were granted in early years would have more time to receive
citations than those granted in more recent years. Thus, each patent’s citation is adjusted
by multiplying with the truncation weight index, which is from Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg (2001) and also found in the NBER patent dataset. I use the application year
as the relevant event time for the study of insider trading since a patent generally is
applied for as soon as a firm has completed the innovation, while the grant date depends
upon the review process at the Patent Office.
An initial patent data is constructed using all patents filed by firms during the
period 1987-2006, 1 except those missing a unique assignee number, or missing a citation
truncation weight as of 2006, or with the status ‘M’ (missing) or ‘W’ (withdrawn).
1 My sample begins with patents applied for in 1987 because insider trading data in TFI Insider database 
starts from 1986 and I need one year of insider trading data before the application of a patent.
Specifically, I define influential patents as patents that are ranked in the top ten-percent 
most cited of the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category in the NBER 
database. The influential firm-year is the year when a firm applies for an influential 
patent. To avoid overlap, if a firm filed influential patents for multiple years, I only 
examine those years separated by at least a two-year gap in the tests. A firm may apply 
for multiple influential patents in a single year.
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedures starting from the 
NBER patent data. During the period 1987-2006, there are total 11,955 firm-years, in 
which at least one patent filed is ranked in the top ten-percent most cited of the year in its 
technology sub-category in the NBER database, corresponding to 2,721 distinct firms. I 
drop 7,674 firm-years (168 firms) in which at least one influential patent was filed in 
each of any two consecutive years, and I drop 21 firm-years (four firms) in which all 
influential patents received zero adjusted citation before the end of year 2006.
This method results in 4,260 firm-years (2,549 firms) in which influential patents 
were filed. I then eliminate 1,478 firm-years (854 firms) which are not listed on CRSP 
and 23 firm-years (ten firms) with unavailable size data (shares outstanding times the 
share price) in the applying-year on CRSP. All the remaining firm-years (854 firms) are 
matched with Compustat database. Finally, I omit 289 firm-years are not listed in the TFI 
insider filing dataset. The final sample (“influential patent” firms) consists of 2,470 firm- 
years with influential patents filed from 1,498 distinct firms.
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Table 1
Sample Selection
Panel A: Sample selection
Criterion
Dropped
firm-
U of 
Firm- Dropped
a o f 
Distinct
years years firms Firms
Total number of observations with at least one
influential patent filed 11955 2721
Less the observations for which influential patents
were filed in any of two consecutive years 7674 168
Less the observation for which influential patents
received zero total adjusted citations 21 4
Number of observations in which influential patent was
filed 4260 2549
Less observations for which their firms are not listed
on CRSP 1478 854
2782 1695
Less observations with unavailable shares
outstanding or the share price data for the applying- 
year on CRSP 23 10
2759 1685
Less observations for which their firms are not
covered in TFI 289 187
Final Sample 2470 1498
Panel B: Summary statistics of influential patents
Cat.
Code
Category Name U of
influential
patents
Percentage
Count
Average
Cites
Average
Cites
Adjusted for 
Truncations
1 Chemical 484 13.7% 23.26 40.88
2 Computers & Communications 811 22.9% 42.21 85.27
3 Drugs & Medical 523 14.8% 34.88 59.45
4 Electrical & Electronic 630 17.8% 29.17 55.10
5 Mechanical 493 13.9% 24.81 43.47
6 Others 597 16.9% 25.14 43.34
Total 3538 100.0% 30.91 57.11
Panel A shows the sample selection out of the 11,955 firm-years (2,721 distinct firms) in which at least one 
patent filed is ranked in the top ten-percent most cited of the application year in its three-digit technology 
class (influential patents) in the NBER database during 1987-2006. Panel B provides the technology class 
distribution, average cites, and average adjusted cites for the sample of 3,538 influential patents 
(corresponding to 2,470 filing firm-years). The influential firm-year is the year when a firm applies for an 
influential patent. To avoid overlap, if a firm files influential patents for multiple years, 1 only include those 
years separated by at least two years. The adjusted citation is computed as the citation times the truncation 
weight index from the NBER patent dataset.
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Panel B of Table 1 provides the distribution of technology classes for the sample 
o f influential patents. My main sample includes 2,470 filing firm-years, in which total 
3,538 influential patents were filed. These influential patents cover 333 patent classes 
among the more than 400 main (three-digit) patent classes defined by the USPTO. 
According to the higher-level classification developed in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
(2001), I aggregate all the classes into six main categories: Chemical (excluding Drugs); 
Computers and Communications; Drugs and Medical; Electrical and Electronics; 
Mechanical; and Others. Average citations and adjusted citations (the citation times the 
truncation weight index) are also provided in Panel B. Influential patents within the 
Computers and Communications category account for the most in the sample (22.9%). 
They additionally have the highest average citation count at 42.21 and adjusted citation 
count at 85.27. The next categories are Electrical and Electronics and Others, accounting 
for 17.8% and 16.9% respectively. The remaining influential patents distribute evenly 
among the other three categories from 13.7% to 14.8%.
Two Cross-Sectional Control Samples 
Two control samples are constructed: an industry-size matched sample of “no- 
influential patent” firms and an unmatched sample of “inconsequential patent” firms. All 
control firms are required to have data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI. For the sample 
of “no-influential patent” firms, I first exclude any firm with an influential patent filed 
from 1987 to 2006. Each firm-year in the sample of “influential patent” firms is then 
matched to a control firm-year with the closest market capitalization in the application 
year from the same two-digit primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. I 
perform the match without replacement. A “no-influential patent” matched firm might or
might not apply for a patent in the matched year. The industry-size matched “no- 
influential patent” firms consist of 2,470 firm-years, corresponding to 1,386 distinct 
firms.
The sample of “inconsequential patent” firms consists of all firm-years in which 
at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten-percent most cited of the application 
year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification, and 
the firm did not have any influential patent during the period 1987-2006. The sample of 
“inconsequential patent” firms consists of 1,699 firm-years, corresponding to 346 distinct 
firms. Because of the relatively small number of “inconsequential patent” firms (346) 
compared to the number of “influential patent” firms (1,498), the sample of 
“inconsequential patent” firms is not matched to “influential patent” firms by industry 
and year.
Table 2 reports mean and median values of financial and operating characteristics 
for the main sample and two control samples. Using p-values of two-tailed t-tests and 
two-tailed Wilcoxon tests, Table 2 also reports differences in means and in medians 
between “influential patent” firms and each of the two control samples. Firm value, sales, 
total assets, and financial leverage ratios are for the fiscal year prior to the application 
year. Firms’ sizes are similar in the two samples, with a mean market capitalization (total 
assets) of $1,454 million ($1,852 million) for “influential patent” firms and $1,258 
million ($1,956 million) for “no-influential patent” firms.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
M ean M ed ian
(1) (2) (3) p-value p-value (1) (2) (3) p-value p-value
“Influential ’’N o- “Inconsequ ( l) - (2 ) ( l)-(3 ) “Influential "No- “Inconseque d ) - (2 ) d ) - (3 )
patent” influential ential patent” influential ntial patent”
firms patent” patent” firms patent” firms
firms firms firms
Firm size 
Market value o f  equity ($
m ill.) 1454 1258 17129 0.260 0.000 229 200 4439 0.022 0.000
Sales ($ m ill.) 1127 1082 11719 0.711 0.000 149 146 4836 0.742 0.000
Total assets ($ mill.) 1852 1956 16239 0.816 0.000 147 142 5053 0.519 0.000
Firm value ($ mill.) 2921 2860 29061 0.913 0.000 323 286 8489 0.092 0.000
Stock volatility and nrior 
returns
a(% ) 3.75 3.69 2 .36 0.385 0.000 3.39 3.26 1.97 0.080 0.000
PRET(-1) (%) 22.52 26.31 19.15 0.176 0.164 6.74 9.52 14.07 0.047 0.000
Growth
B/M 0.62 0.58 2 .09 0.330 0.000 0.43 0.45 0.39 0.216 0.000
Firm value/Total assets 2.97 2.51 2.01 0.014 0.000 1.69 1.58 1.57 0.001 0.000
Sales growth rate (%) 19.33 16.79 7.93 0.064 0.000 10.19 10.29 6.04 0.837 0.000
Operating Derformance (%)
O P A (-l) -1.22 3.48 9 .49 0.000 0.000 8.12 8.90 10.30 0.013 0.000
OPA(-2) -1.07 2.36 9.68 0.016 0.000 8.20 8.92 10.30 0.031 0.002
OPA(-3) -0.86 3.58 9 .60 0.001 0.000 8.50 9.03 10.41 0.033 0.000
OPA 0.85 4.20 9.95 0.000 0.000 8.05 8.54 10.15 0.089 0.000
Financial leverage
Long-term debt/total assets 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.000 0.000 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.000 0.000
Long-term debt/firm value 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.000 0.000 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.000 0.000
This table provides summary statistics of firm characteristics for the sample o f “influential patent” firms and two control samples. The sample of “influential 
patent” firms consists of firms with influential patents filed during 1987-2006. The two control samples are “no-influential patent” firms and the “inconsequential 
patent” firms. We define influential patents as those top ten-percent most cited patents of the application year in its 3-digit technology sub-category based on the 
USPTO classification. The influential firm-year is the year when a firm applies for an influential patent. Both control samples are required to have corresponding 
data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent during the sample period.
Table 2 (Continued)
To construct the matched sample of “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample of “influential patent” firms is matched to a control firm-year with 
the closest market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample of “inconsequential patent” firms 
consists of firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited o f the application year in its technology sub-category in the 
NBER database. All firms of the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Each o f the samples of “influential patent” firms and “no- 
influential patent” firms consists of 2,470 firm-years, while the sample of “inconsequential patent” firms consists of 1,699 firm-years. Market value o f equity is 
measured at the end of calendar year prior to the application year. Firm value equals (book value of total assets -  book value o f equity + market value o f equity). 
Firm value, sales, total assets, and financial leverage ratios are for fiscal year prior to the application year. Stock return volatility (o) is the standard deviation of  
stock returns for the year prior to application year. PRET(-l) (prior stock returns) is computed as the buy-and-hold returns over one year prior to the application 
year. B/M is calculated as book value of equity divided by market value o f equity as of the end of fiscal year before the year applying influential patent. Sales 
growth is defined as [sales(-l)/sales(-5)]1/4-l. OPA(t) is the operating performance to total assets for year t relative to the application year (t=0). Operation 
performance is operating income before depreciation. OPA is the mean o f OPA(t), equal to (OPA(-l)+OPA(-2)+OPA(-3))/3. Other than been stated, all other 
financial data are from Compustat. The differences in means between two samples are tested by two independent samples t-test, and the differences in medians 
are tested by Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test. P-values are reported.
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The mean daily stock volatility for “influential patent” firms is 3.75%, similar to 
the one for “no-influential patent” firms, 3.69%. The prior stock returns are close at 
22.52% and 26.31%. One of three growth measures, the B/M ratio, indicates that two 
groups have similar growth opportunities. None of these differences between firms with 
influential or non-influential patents is statistically significant. Other measures between 
the two samples are significantly different, including the operating performance 
(measured by operating income before depreciation to total assets), financial leverages, 
and the other two growth measures (firm value/total assets and sales growth rate).
Firms with inconsequential patents are significantly different from firms with 
influential patents. On average, firms with inconsequential patents are larger in size, have 
a lower stock volatility, a lower growth opportunity, and a better prior operating 
performance.
Time-Series Control
For each observation in the sample of “influential patent” firms and two control 
samples, I analyze insiders’ open market trading during the informed and control periods. 
The informed period is the calendar year before a patent is filed (the pre-application 
year). The control period is the calendar year when a firm applies for a patent (the 
application year). I examine insider trading before the application year of a patent 
because, as discussed above, insiders clearly have information and foresight on 
innovation at the first stage of the preparation for the patent application, and their trading 
at that period is less likely to be noticed by regulators and investors. I do not examine 
insider trading after the application year of the patent because the news of applying for a’ 
patent might leak out in some way, and outsiders might pay more attention to insiders
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patent might leak out in some way, and outsiders might pay more attention to insiders 
actions, which reduces insiders’ incentive to trade on the basis of knowledge of 
innovation.
Stock-Price Reaction when an Influential/
Inconsequential Patent Is Granted
To verify the positive association between influential patents and the filing firm’s 
future stock performances, I first investigate the stock-price reaction when an influential 
patent is granted. For comparison, I also present corresponding reactions when an 
inconsequential patent is granted. I do not examine such stock-price reaction for the 
matched “no-influential patent” firms, because these firms are not required to have 
patents filed in the year they are matched with “influential patent” firms.
The abnormal return of stock i on day t is computed as:
e„=r„ - r ml, (1)
where r* and rm are the stock returns for firm i and the market, respectively. The market 
return is the return on the CRSP value-weighted stock index. I then calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for firm i over days (tj, t2) as:
CAK *  =  • ( 2 )
>=> i
Table 3 reports the mean and median values of CARs for the samples of 
“influential patent” and “inconsequential patent” firms over three windows covering the 
trading days (-1, +1), (-5, +5) and (-20, +5) around the announcement date of a patent 
being granted (day 0).
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Table 3
Stock-Price Reaction when an Influential/Inconsequential Patent Is Granted
Days around announcement
Category N Mean Median
(-1.+1) (-5,+5) (-20, +5) (-1.+1) (-5, +5) (-20, +5)
(1) Influential patents
granted
(p-value)
3,478 0.27** 0 95*** 1.50*** -0.11 0.05* 0.27**
(0.0213) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9347) (0.0745) (0.0117)
(2) Inconsequential 36,005 0.04** -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.20*** -0.14**patents granted 
(p-value) (0.0159) (0.1634) (0.3029) (0.6940) (0.0003) (0.0392)
(1) vs. (2) difference 0.23*** 1.00*** 1.55*** -0.06 0.25 0.41**
(p-value) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3844) (0.1263) (0.0464)
This table reports the mean/median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and average CARs differences for 
three windows around a patent’s granting date (day 0) for the samples of “influential patent” firms and 
“inconsequential patent” firms. The sample of “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential 
patents filed during 1987-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten-percent most cited patents 
of the application year in its technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. The sample of  
“inconsequential patent” firms consists of firm-years in which at least one patent applied for is ranked in 
the bottom ten-percent most cited of the application year in its technology sub-category in the NBER 
database. “Inconsequential patent” firms are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and 
TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent in the sample period. For each patent granted, the abnormal 
return for trading day t is calculated as the daily return on the stock minus the value-weighted CRSP index 
on day t. Both returns include dividends. There are 3,478 (36,005) influential patents (inconsequential 
patents) with available return data on CRSP around the grant date, corresponding to 1,475 (342) applying 
firms in 2,432 (1,692) firm-years. Mean/median and differences values are reported as percentages. The 
differences in means are tested by two independent samples t-test, and the differences in medians are tested 
by Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively
The observation size for Table 3 is 3,468 for the sample of “influential patent” 
firms, indicating 3,468 patents were granted with available firms’ return data on CRSP 
for the 2,470 firm-years in which at least one influential patent was filed. For 
“inconsequential patent” firms, the sample size is more than ten times larger, with 
36,004 patents granted for 1,699 firm-years. The difference in the sample sizes is 
consistent with the notion that a few patents with good quality are extremely valuable, 
while many others are worth comparatively little. Therefore, it is justified to separate 
influential patents from other patents in my study.
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Over the trading window of three days (-1, +1), both groups experience 
significantly positive mean CARs of about 0.27% and 0.04%, respectively. However, 
over the longer trading windows of days (-5, +5) and (-20, +5), firms with influential 
patents granted experience positively larger mean CARs of about 0.95% and 1.5%, which 
are statistically significant at the one percent level, while firms with inconsequential 
patents granted experience a negative mean CARs at 0.05%, though not statistically 
significant. The median values of CARs have similar patterns, except that CARs in the 
three trading days are negative and non-significant for both groups, and the negative 
median CARs of “inconsequential patent” firms over the two longer trading windows are 
significant at five percent and one percent level. All three mean values of CARs are 
significantly higher for firms with influential patents than for firms with inconsequential 
patents at one percent level. The results show that stock price reacts positively to the 
news that an influential patent is granted and negatively when an inconsequential patent 
is granted, indicating that the market has the ability to distinguish influential patents from 
inconsequential patents when a patent is granted. The fact that the market reacts to the 
news of an influential patent being granted also suggests that non-public information does 
exist for a long period in firms with influential innovation.
Long-Run Stock Performance 
I next compare the long-run stock performances between the sample of 
“influential patent” firms and two control samples. I use the standard Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model to estimate the long-run abnormal returns for firms in each 
sample:
R ,-R F l = a  + fM KTRF, + f 2HMLt + fcSMB, + e, , (3)
where R, is the monthly stock return for a firm, RF, is the monthly risk-free rate, Rr  RF,
is the excess return, MKTRF, is the excess return on the market, measured as the value- 
weighted market return minus the risk-free rate, HMLt (High Minus Low) is the average 
return on the two highest value (high book-to-market) portfolios minus the average return 
on the two highest growth (low book-to-market) portfolios, and SMB, (Small Minus Big) 
is the average return on the three smallest capitalization portfolios minus the average 
return on the three biggest capitalization portfolios. The alpha (a) coefficient represents 
the difference between the monthly return predicted by the three factors and the actual 
monthly return, so alpha is viewed as the long-run abnormal return.
Table 4 reports the average long-run abnormal returns and the average return 
difference between the sample of “influential patent” firms and two control samples in 
two years following the application year. For the application year (year 0), the abnormal 
returns of “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms are not significantly 
different at 0.83% and 0.87%, respectively. However, when investors hold the stock for a 
longer time, “influential patent” firms outperform both control samples.
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Table 4
Long-Run Stock Performance
Year
N Mean long-run abnormal returns (%) Returns Difference (%)
(1)& (2) 
“Influential 
patent” firms 
& ’’N o- 
influential 
patent” firms
(3)
“Inconse­
quential
patent”
firms
(1)
“Influential 
patent” firms
(2)
”N o -“
influential
patent”
firms
(3)
Inconse­
quential
patent”
firms
( l ) - ( 2 ) t-stat ^  (3) t Stat
0 2470 1699 0.83** 0.87** 0.28*** -0.05 -0.1 0.55 1.34
( 0 , + l ) 2470 1699 1.04*** 0.53*** 0.20*** 0.51 4.31*** 0 .846 .96***
(0, +2) 2470 1699 0.94*** 0.50*** 0.22*** 0.43 4.51*** 0.72 7.21***
This table reports the mean long-run abnormal returns and the average return difference between the 
sample of “influential patent” firms and two control samples in two years after the application year (year 
0). The sample of “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential patents filed during 1987- 
2006. The two control samples are “no-influential patent” firms and “inconsequential patent” firms. The 
standard Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is used to estimate the long-run abnormal returns for 
firms in each sample based on their monthly returns data on CRSP. Influential patents are identified as 
those top ten-percent most cited patents o f the application year in its technology sub-category based on 
USPTO classification. To construct the matched sample o f “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in 
the sample of “influential patent” firms is matched to a control firm-year with the closest market 
capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample 
of “inconsequential patent” firms consists o f firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the 
bottom ten-percent most cited of the application year in its technology sub-category in the NBER database. 
Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TF1, and did not 
apply for any influential patent during the sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the 
NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Each o f the samples of “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms 
consists of 2,470 firm-years, while the sample of “inconsequential patent” firms consists of 1,699 firm- 
years. Mean values and returns differences are reported as percentages. The returns differences in Column 
((l)-(2)) are tested by two-tailed matched-pair t-tests, and those in Column ((1) vs. (3)) are by two 
independent samples t-tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten 
percent levels, respectively.
In years (0, +1) and (0, +2), the mean abnormal returns for “influential patent” 
firms are, respectively, 1.04% and 0.94%, while for “no-influential patent” firms, they are 
only 0.53% and 0.50%. The differences of abnormal returns between “influential patent” 
and “no-influential patent” firms Eire significantly positive at 0.51% and 0.43%. The 
differences of abnormal returns between “influential patent” and “inconsequential patent” 
firms have a similar pattern, except that the mean abnormal return of “inconsequential 
patent” firms is much smaller and return differences are accordingly larger. I also 
calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns as another measure of long-run performance and
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find similar results. For brevity, results of buy-and-hold abnormal returns are not 
reported.
It is not surprising that firms with influential patents have better long-run 
performances than others due to the long-term effect of technological innovation on 
firms’ future development. This evidence together with the stock-price reaction evidence 
supports my definition of influential patents in that those technologies are influential and 
may signal future economic performance of firms.
Insider Trading Data
Insider trading data is obtained from Thomson Financial Insiders Filings Data 
Files (TFI, September 2007). This data contains all insider activities as reported on Form 
Three, Four, and Five filed with the SEC.2 Focusing on the Table One in TFI database, I 
only consider two types of insider transactions, ‘open market or private purchase of non­
derivative or derivative security’ and ‘open market or private sale of non-derivative 
security’, for each “influential patent” and control firm during the pre-application and 
application years. I drop filings marked as inaccurate or incomplete by TFI (Cleanse 
Indicators as ‘S’ or ‘A’), filings labeled as an amendment to an earlier filing (Amendment 
Indicator as ‘A’), or transactions that involve shares indirectly owned by insiders via a 
partnership, corporation, trust or other entity (Ownership Type as ‘I’). The open-market 
stock transactions of three groups of corporate insiders are examined: all insiders, top 
management, and all insiders except for large blockholders. The top management group 
consists of Chairman, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO),
2 Most insider transactions are reported on Form Four. Form Three is the initial statement of beneficial 
ownership that insiders must file. Form Five is an annual statement of change in beneficial ownership and 
contains activity from small or exempt transactions that are not reported on Form Four.
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and President in a firm. Blockholders are beneficial owners of more than ten percent of 
any class of equity securities of a firm.
Following prior studies, I use three measures to examine the level of insider 
trading: number of shares traded by insiders (#shares), dollar value of shares traded by 
insiders ($shares), and percentage of outstanding equity traded by insiders (%equity). The 
dollar value of shares traded is the number of shares traded multiplied by the transaction 
price reported on the TFI insider filing data. The percentage of outstanding equity traded 
equals the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding at the 
end of calendar year. In the following tests, for observations without any insider purchase 
or sales over the informed or control periods, I assign zero to the measures of insider 
purchases or sales.
Results
Univariate Results
Univariate results are presented for insider purchases, sales, and net purchases 
(purchases - sales) in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7, respectively.
Insider Purchases
Table 5 provides mean values of three measures of insider purchases for the 
sample of “influential patent” firms and two control samples during the informed and 
control periods. The informed period is the calendar year before a patent was filed. The 
control period is the calendar year when a firm applied for a patent. Panels A to C present 
the results for each of three groups of insiders: 1) all insiders, 2) top management, 3) all 
insiders except for large blockholders.
Table 5
Univariate Test: Insider Purchases
Panel A: All insiders
Statistic
“Influential 
patent” firms
”No-influential 
patent” firms
“Inconsequential 
patent” firms p-values
Insider buy 
measures
(1)
Pre-
apply
year
(2)
Apply
year
(3)
Pre-
apply
year
(4)
Apply
year
(5)
Pre-
apply
year
(6)
Apply
year (D-(2) (1M3) (D-(5) (3)-(4) (5)-(6)
(1-2)-
(3-4)
(1-2)-
(5-6)
mean
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.060
1.174
0.004
0.046
0.601
0.003
0.061
0.714
0.003
0.078
0.889
0.004
0.023
0.661
0.001
0.023
0.661
0.001
0.366
0.133
0.677
0.952
0.258
0.555
0.033
0.267
0.013
0.416
0.459
0.224
0.956
1.000
0.669
0.235
0.097
0.278
0.458
0.237
0.677
Panel B: Top management
Statistic
“Influential patent” 
firms
”No-influential 
patent” firms
“Inconsequential 
patent” firms p-values
Insider
buy
measures
(1)
Pre-
apply
year
(2)
Apply
year
(3)
Pre-
apply
year
(4)
Apply
year
(5)
Pre-
apply
year
(6)
Apply
year (D-(2) (1H3) (1K 5) (3)-(4) (5)-(6)
d-2)-
(3-4)
(1-2)-
(5-6)
mean
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.006
0.053
0.000
0.008
0.083
0.001
0.006
0.061
0.000
0.010
0.134
0.001
0.002
0.069
0.000
0.002
0.044
0.000
0.090
0.077
0.101
0.849
0.575
0.834
0.008
0.527
0.000
0.131
0.231
0.086
0.966
0.357
0.098
0.622
0.504
0.902
0.174
0.070
0.402
Panel C: All insiders but blockholders
Statistic
“Influential patent” 
firms
”No-influential 
patent” firms
“Inconsequential 
patent” firms p-values
Insider
buy
measures
(1)
Pre-
apply
year
(2)
Apply
year
(3)
Pre-
apply
year
(4)
Apply
year
(5)
Pre-
apply
year
(6)
Apply
year (l)-(2) (D-(3) (1>(5) (3)-(4) (5)-(6)
(1-2)-
(3-4)
(1-2)-
(5-6)
Table 5 (Continued)
mean
#shares 0.060 0.046 0.061 0.078 0.023 0.023 0.365 0.953 0.033 0.415 0.956 0.234 0.457
Sshares 1.173 0.600 0.714 0.889 0.661 0.661 0.134 0.259 0.268 0.457 0.999 0.097 0.237
%equity 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.676 0.554 0.013 0.223 0.670 0.277 0.676
This table reports the mean values of three measures of insider purchases for “influential patent” firms and two control samples during the informed and control 
periods. “Influential patent” firms consist of firms with influential patents filed during 1987-2006. The two control samples are “no-influential patent” firms and 
“inconsequential patent” firms. The informed period is the calendar year before a patent is filed. The control period is the calendar year a firm applies for a 
patent. Separated by at least a two-year gap, influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents of the application year in its technology 
sub-category based on the USPTO classification. To construct the matched sample of “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample o f “influential 
patent” firms is matched to a control firm-year with the closest market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same 
year. The sample of “inconsequential patent” firms consists of firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent least cited o f the 
application year in its technology sub-category in the NBER database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and 
TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent during the sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Panels A 
to C show the results for each of three groups of corporate insiders: all insiders, top management, and all insiders but blockholders. The top management group 
consists of Chairman, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), and President in a firm. Blockholders are beneficial owners o f more than 
ten percent of any class of equity securities of a firm. For each firm-year, I report insider purchase activity during the pre-application and application years. The 
three measures of insider purchases are #shares (number of shares bought by insiders in millions during a year), Sshares (dollar value of shares bought by insiders 
in millions during a year), and %equity (number of shares bought by insiders during a year divided by number o f outstanding shares). All insiders trading data is 
from Thomson Insiders Filings database. The differences in means are tested by two-tailed matched-pair t-tests except that we use independent samples t-test to 
compare means for the sample of “influential patent” firms and the sample of “inconsequential patent” firms. The p-values of differences are reported in the 
table.
Table 6
Univariate Test: Insider Sales
Panel A: All insiders
Statistic
“Influential patent” 
firms
”No-influential 
patent” firms
“Inconsequential 
patent” firms p-values
Insider
sales
measures
(1) 
Pre- 
apply 
i year
(2)
Apply
year
(3)
Pre-
apply
year
(4)
Apply
year
(5)
Pre-
apply
year
(6)
Apply
year d)-(2) (D-(3) (0-(5) (3)-(4) (5)-(6)
(1-2)-
(3-4)
(1-2)-
(5-6)
mean
#shares 0.188 0.292 0.288 0.433 0.239 0.278 0.001 0.024 0.063 0.087 0.198 0.648 0.153
Sshares 6.093 8.935 7.494 11.342 13.746 15.436 0.003 0.242 0.000 0.123 0.450 0.702 0.597
%equity 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.036 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.422 0.196
Panel B: Top management
Statistic
“Influential patent” 
firms
”No-influential 
patent” firms
“Inconsequential 
patent” firms p-values
Insider
sales
measures
(1)
Pre-
apply
year
(2)
Apply
year
(3)
Pre-
apply
year
(4)
Apply
year
(5)
Pre-
apply
year
(6)
Apply
year (l)-(2) 0 H 3 ) (l)-(5) (3)-(4) (5)-(6)
(1-2)-
(3-4)
(1-2)-
(5-6)
mean
#shares 0.043 0.058 0.041 0.059 0.050 0.056 0.073 0.708 0.357 0.007 0.287 0.749 0.411
Sshares 1.709 2.076 1.286 1.549 2.585 2.885 0.294 0.153 0.025 0.214 0.315 0.789 0.892
%equity 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.828 0.000 0.000 0.541 0.035 0.094
Panel C: All insiders but blockholders
“Influential patent” ”No-influential “Inconsequential
Statistic firms patent” firms patent” firms p-values
(1) (3) (5)
Insider Pre- (2) Pre- (4) Pre- (6)
sales apply Apply apply Apply apply Apply (1-2)- (1-2)-
measures year year year year year year 0X 2) (l)-(3) O H 5) (3)-(4) (5)-(6) (3-4) (5-6)
Table 6 (Continued)
mean
#shares 0.187 0.292 0.288 0.433 0.239 0.278 0.001 0.023 0.060 0.089 0.197 0.658 0.149
Sshares 6.055 8.931 7.489 11.324 13.740 15.430 0.002 0.230 0.000 0.124 0.450 0.716 0.585
%equity 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.035 0.000 0.010 0.005 0.439 0.201
This table reports the mean values of three measures of insider sales for “influential patent” firms and two control samples during the informed and control 
periods. “Influential patent” firms consist of firms with influential patents filed during 1987-2006. The two control samples are “no-influential patent” firms and 
“inconsequential patent” firms. The informed period is the calendar year before a patent is filed. The control period is the calendar year a firm applies for a 
patent. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents of the application year in its technology sub-category based on the USPTO 
classification. To construct the matched sample o f “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample o f “influential patent” firms is matched to a control 
firm-year with the closest market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample o f “inconsequential 
patent” firms consists of firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited of the application year in its technology sub­
category in the NBER database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any 
influential patent during the sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Panels A to C show the results for each 
of three groups of corporate insiders: all insiders, top management, and all insiders but blockholders. The top management group consists o f  Chairman, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), and President in a firm. Blockholders are beneficial owners of more than ten percent o f any class of  
equity securities o f a firm. For each firm-year, I report insider sale activity during the pre-application and application years. The three measures o f insider sales 
are #shares (number of shares sold by insiders in millions during a year), Sshares (dollar value o f shares sold by insiders in millions during a year), and %equity 
(number o f shares sold by insiders during a year divided by number of outstanding shares). All insiders trading data is from Thomson Insiders Filings database. 
The differences in means are tested by two-tailed matched-pair t-tests except that we use independent samples t-test to compare means for the sample of  
“influential patent” firms and the sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms. The p-values of differences are reported in the table.
Table 7
Univariate Test: Insiders ’ Net Purchases
Panel A: All insiders
Statistic
“Influential patent” 
firms
”No-influential 
patent” firms
“Inconsequential 
patent” firms p-values
Insider net buy 
measures
(1)
Pre­
apply
year
(2)
Apply
year
(3)
Pre-
appiy
year
(4)
Apply
year
(5)
Pre-
apply
year
(6)
Apply
year (D-(2) (l)-(3) (1H5) (3)-(4) (5)-(6)
(1-2)-
(3-4)
(1-2)-
(5-6)
mean
#shares
Sshares
%equity
-0.129
-4.931
-0.005
-0.247
-8.337
-0.008
-0.227
-6.784
-0.008
-0.355
-10.454
-0.011
-0.214
-13.041
-0.002
-0.253
-14.731
-0.003
0.001
0.001
0.010
0.043
0.141
0.045
0.008
0.000
0.019
0.144
0.142
0.071
0.222
0.454
0.021
0.917
0.922
0.999
0.114
0.444
0.206
Panel B: Top management
Statistic
“Influential patent” 
firms
”No-influential 
patent” firms
“Inconsequential 
patent” firms p-values
Insider net buy 
measures
(1)
Pre-
apply
year
(2)
Apply
year
(3)
Pre-
apply
year
(4)
Apply
year
(5)
Pre-
apply
year
(6)
Apply
year (1>(2) (l)-(3) (l)-(5) (3)-(4) (5)-(6)
(1-2)-
(3-4)
(1-2)-
(5-6)
mean
#shares
Sshares
%equity
-0.038
-1.657
-0.001
-0.050
-1.992
-0.001
-0.035
-1.225
-0.001
-0.049
-1.416
-0.002
-0.047
-2.517
0.000
-0.053
-2.841
0.000
0.153
0.337
0.242
0.683
0.146
0.919
0.173
0.029
0.000
0.051
0.384
0.001
0.290
0.280
0.881
0.872
0.711
0.058
0.580
0.982
0.327
Panel C: All insiders but blockholders
Statistic
“Influential patent” 
firms
”No-influential 
patent” firms
“Inconsequential 
patent” firms p-values
Insider net buy 
measures
(1)
Pre-
apply
year
(2)
Apply
year
(3)
Pre-
appiy
year
(4)
Apply
year
(5)
Pre­
apply
year
(6)
Apply
year (D-(2) 0)-(3) (l)-(5) (3)-(4) (5)-(6)
(1-2)-
(3-4)
(1-2)-
(5-6)
Table 7 (Continued)
mean
#shares -0.128 -0.247 -0.227 -0.354 -0.214 -0.253 0.001 0.042 0.007 0.146 0.221 0.928 0.112
Sshares -4.894 -8.334 -6.780 -10.436 -13.035 -14.726 0.001 0.133 0.000 0.144 0.453 0.936 0.435
%equity__________ -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 -0.001 -0.003 0.010 0.045 0.018 0.075 0.019 0.979 0.209
This table reports the mean values of three measures of insider’ net purchases for “influential patent” firms and two control samples during the informed and 
control periods. “Influential patent” firms consist of firms with influential patents filed during 1987-2006. The two control samples are “no-influential patent” 
firms and “inconsequential patent” firms. The informed period is the calendar year before a patent is filed. The control period is the calendar year a firm applies 
for a patent. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents o f the application year in its technology sub-category based on the 
USPTO classification.. To construct the matched sample of “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample of “influential patent” firms is matched to 
a control firm-year with the closest market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample of 
“inconsequential patent” firms consists o f firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited of the application year in its 
technology sub-category in the NBER database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not 
apply for any influential patent during the sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Panel A to C show the 
results for each of three groups of corporate insiders: all insiders, top management, and all insiders but blockholders. The top management group consists of 
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), and President in a firm. Blockholders are beneficial owners o f more than ten percent 
of any class o f equity securities of a firm. For each firm-year, I report insiders’ net purchase activity during the pre-application and application years. The three 
measures o f insiders’ net purchases are #shares (net number of shares bought by insiders in millions during a year), Sshares (net dollar value o f shares bought by 
insiders in millions during a year), and %equity (number of shares bought on the net during a year divided by number o f outstanding shares). All insiders trading 
data is from Thomson Insiders Filings database.The differences in means are tested by two-tailed matched-pair t-tests except that we use independent samples t- 
test to compare means for the sample of “influential patent” firms and the sample of “inconsequential patent” firms. The p-values o f differences are reported in 
the table.
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The three measures of insider purchases are number of shares bought in millions 
by insiders during a year (#shares), dollar value of shares bought in millions by insiders 
during a year (Sshares), and percentage of outstanding equity bought by insiders during a 
year (%equity). The dollar value of shares bought is the number of shares bought 
multiplied by the transaction price reported on the TFI insider filing data.
Table 5 also reports p-values from t-tests. Between “influential patent” and “no- 
influential patent” firms (p-values (l)-(2), (l)-(3), (3)-(4), (5)-(6), and (l-2)-(3-4)), two- 
tailed paired t-tests is used for the difference in means. Between “influential patent” and 
“inconsequential patent” firms (p-values (l)-(5) and (l-2)-(5-6)), two independent 
samples t-tests are used for the differences in means. Column (l)-(2) (Column (3)-(4)) 
shows p-values of test statistics for the change in the level of purchases of insiders in 
“influential patent” firms (“no-influential patent” firms) between the pre-application and 
control periods (i.e., the time-series control); Column (l)-(3) shows p-values for the 
difference in the level of purchases of insiders in the pre-application period between 
“influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms (i.e., the cross-sectional control); 
and Column (l-2)-(3-4) is for the difference between (a) the change in the level of 
purchases of insiders in “influential patent” firms between the pre-application and control 
periods and (b) the change in the level of purchases of insiders in “no-influential patent” 
firms between the pre-application and control periods (i.e., DID, difference-in-differences 
control). Similarly, for “inconsequential patent” firms, p-values are provided in Column 
(l)-(5), Column (5)-(6), and Column (l-2)-(5-6).
Based on the time-series control, for “influential patent” firms, the group of top 
management (Panel B) purchases significantly fewer stocks during the pre-application
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year than the control period, while the groups of all insiders and the all insiders but large 
blockholders show similar and insignificant results. However, the level of their buying 
appears to be normal based on either the cross-sectional or DID control for all three 
groups in “influential patent” firms. Compared with top managers in “inconsequential 
patent” firms, those in “influential patent” firms purchase significantly more stocks 
during the informed period, though the mean dollar value of stocks they bought is not 
unusual.
Insider Sales
Univariate results of insider sales are reported in Table 6. The format of Table 6 is 
similar to that of Table 5, except that the measures of insider purchases are replaced by 
the measures of insider sales. Based on the time-series control, Column (l)-(2) shows that 
insiders in “influential patent” firms sell significantly fewer stocks during the pre­
application year compared to the number they sell during the control year, which 
indicates they delay their sales in the pre-application year until the application year. 
Based on the cross-sectional control (Column (l)-(5)), insiders in “influential patent” 
firms sell significantly fewer stocks than those in “inconsequential patent” firms in the 
pre-application year. Both conclusions hold for each of three insider groups in Panel A to 
Panel C, and for almost each of three measures of the level of insider sales, yet the 
significant difference does not hold based on the DID control.
Table 6 provides evidence that insiders of firms with influential patents 
significantly delay their stock sales during the pre-application year relative to the 
application year, but the reduction relative to the delay is not significantly higher than the 
changes observed from the insider sales in the control firms. The results preliminarily
support the explanation of passive insider trading. Insiders may postpone their planned 
sales to avoid the penalties or notice from insider trading regulators.
Insider Net Purchases
Table 7 examines the level of stock net purchases of insiders. Based on the time- 
series control (Column (l)-(2)), insiders in “influential patent” firms have significantly 
higher level of net purchases during the pre-application year. The levels of insiders’ net 
purchases in the two control samples do not have significant change. This pattern remains 
consistent for both groups of all insiders and all insiders except for large blockholders in 
“influential patent” firms. Based on the cross-sectional control (Column (l)-(5)), insiders 
in “influential patent” firms purchase significantly more stocks on the net than those in 
“inconsequential patent” firms in the pre-application year. Both conclusions hold for all 
three insider groups in Panel A to Panel C, and for almost all three measures of the level 
of insider net purchases. Nevertheless, based on the DID control, no evidence indicates 
unusual levels of net purchases by insiders in firms with influential patents during the 
pre-application year.
In summary, the univariate results imply that while insiders generally keep their 
purchases at the normal level, their net purchases are higher due to the lower level of 
sales in the year before the filing of influential patents. This pattern is similar to the 
profitable passive insider trading pattern of target firms’ insiders before takeover 
announcements, as suggested in Agrawal and Nasser (2012).
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
While univariate results provide some preliminary evidence under two sets of 
controls: the time-series and cross-sectional control, they do not control for other
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determinants of the level of insider trading. I estimate cross-sectional regressions of the 
level of insider trading when controlling for other determinants. The regression results for 
purchases, sales, and net purchases of three insiders groups are presented.
Regression Specification
Prior studies find that several factors influence the level of insider trading, such as 
firm size, the level of stock volatility, prior stock performance, stock liquidity, firm 
valuation, and innovation. I attempt to control for these various factors in the cross- 
sectional regressions, for the sample of “influential patent” firms and two control samples 
respectively. All explanatory variables in the regression include two observations: One is 
for the pre-application (informed) period and the other is for the control period. A binary 
dummy variable ‘Pre-apply’ is used to represent the two observations, which equals one 
if the insider trading activity occurs during the pre-application year and zero otherwise. 
My model is constructed as Equation (4), and each measure of these control variables are 
described below:
ITt =a^+ /?, Ln(Market_ Cap), + /?2cr, + f33PRETv + J34B/M _decilq+J3SR&D/Saleq 
+ J3()Liquidity+ /?7 Pr e_apply+eni = 1,2,...
Firm size (Ln(Market Cap)): Seyhun (1986) finds insiders are likely to be net 
purchasers in small firms and net sellers in large firms. I control firm size by using the 
natural logarithm of the market capitalization. Market cap is computed as the number of 
total common shares outstanding times the share price at the last trading day during the 
calendar year prior to the pre-application year or the application year on CRSP monthly 
dataset.
Stock volatility (a): Meulbroek (2000) finds that insiders’ sales are more 
aggressive in those more risky companies. The risk of a stock can be measured by the
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standard deviation of stock returns of a firm over all trading days during the year before 
the pre-application year or the application year on CRSP daily dataset.
Prior stock performance (PRET.j): Lakonishok and Lee (2001) argue that insiders 
tend to be contrarian investors who buy stocks when the past returns are low and sell 
them when the past returns are high. Prior stock returns (PRET-i) are computed as the 
buy-and-hold returns over one year prior to the pre-application year or the control year.
Firm valuation (B/M decile): Book-to-market (B/M) ratio is often used to 
measure a firm’s valuation ratio relative to other firms. Jenter (2005) finds that insiders 
trade like contrarian investors by purchasing (selling) a stock when the firm has a low 
(high) valuation. The B/M ratio is computed by dividing the book value of equity by the 
market capitalization of common shares outstanding at the end of calendar year before 
the pre-application year or the control year. Based on NYSE B/M decile breakpoints in a 
given year, B/M decile is assigned to one to ten depending on a firm’s B/M ratio.
Innovation (R&D/Sales): Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that R&D activities 
create unique information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside investors, 
and find that insider gains through insider trading in firms conducting R&D are 
significantly larger than insider gains in firms with no R&D activities. R&D/Sales ratio is 
R&D expenses to sales revenue for the last fiscal year before the pre-application or 
control year. R&D expenses are treated as zero if R&D expenses are missing on 
Compustat.
Stock liquidity: The market microstructure models developed by prior studies 
(i.e., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) suggest that 
informed traders are more likely to trade when stock liquidity is higher. I also control for
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stock liquidity, calculated as the mean daily trading volume divided by shares 
outstanding during the pre-application or control year.
Pre-apply: Pre-apply is a binary dummy variable equal to one if the insider 
trading activity occurs during the pre-application year and zero otherwise.
Controlling for those factors related to insider trading, I compare the regressions’ 
results between the sample of “influential patent” firms and the two control samples, the 
sample of “no-influential patent” firms and the sample of “inconsequential patent” firms. 
The dependent variable (IT) is one of three measures of insider trading: 1) number of 
shares (#shares), 2) dollar value of shares (Sshares), and 3) percentage of outstanding 
equity (%equity) traded by insiders during the period. To reduce the influence from 
outliers, the top and bottom one percent of the observations of the three dependent 
variables in each regression are winsorized. Further, I control for industry and year fixed 
effect in each regression model and calculate test statistics using robust variances.
Insider Purchases
I start by examining insider purchases in Table 8. Panel A shows coefficient 
estimates and p-values from the regressions of all insiders’ purchases in the three 
samples. Panel A.l lists the regression results in the sample of “influential patent” firms, 
Panel A.2 is for the sample of “no-influential patent” firms, and Panel A.3 is for the 
sample of “inconsequential patent” firms. My main interest is in the coefficient of ‘Pre­
apply’, which measures the abnormal trading level of insiders in the pre-application year 
relative to the application year (i.e., the control period).
Table 8
Regressions o f Insider Purchases
Panel A: All insiders' purchases
Independent
Variables
A. 1 “Influential patent” firms A.2 ”No-influential patent” firms A.3 “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables Dependent variables Dependent variables
#shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity
Ln(market cap) 0.000 0.060*** -0.001*** 0.001 0.061*** -0.001*** 0.001 0.069*** -0.000***
(0.869) (0.003) (0.000) (0.468) (0.001) (0.000) (0.351) (0.000) (0.000)
a 0.474*** 0.191 0.023** 0.609** 2.252 0.026 0.707*** 6.176*** 0.022***
(0.000) (0.859) (0.046) (0.010) (0.224) (0.134) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
PRET(-l) -0.002 0.034 0.000 -0.006*** -0.035* -0.000*** -0.011*** -0.127*** -0.000***
(0.404) (0.249) (0.375) (0.000) (0.064) (0.007) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
B/M decile -0.001 -0.016** 0.000 -0.001 -0.011 - 0.000 0.000 0.015 - 0.000
(0.130) (0.048) (0.711) (0.148) (0.270) (0.558) (0.464) (0.195) (0.449)
R&D/Sales -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -0.001 - 0.000
(0.005) (0.067) (0.008) (0.907) (0.990) (0.656) (0.644) (0.342) (0.778)
Liquidity -0.693*** -3.969 -0.031** -0.990*** -7.350** -0.064** 0.025 -0.289 -0.010***
(0.004) (0.150) (0.030) (0.008) (0.050) (0.012) (0.757) (0.836) (0.003)
Pre-apply -0.001 -0.014 0.000 -0.003 -0.034 - 0.000 -0.001 -0.021 - 0.000
(0.776) (0.763) (0.177) (0.449) (0.453) (0.327) (0.573) (0.690) (0.311)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4220 4220 4220 4107 4107 4107 3183 3183 3183
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.029 0.05 0.024 0.034 0.027 0.03 0.021 0.129
Panel B: other insiders' purchases
Insider Group
B. 1 “Influential patent” firms B.2 ”No-influential patent” firms B.3 “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables Dependent variables Dependent variables
#shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity
Top managers 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.783) (0.949) (0.478)
0.000 0.004 0.000 
(0.694) (0.386) (0.883)
0.000 -0.002 0.000 
(0.349) (0.706) (0.128)
All insiders but 
blockholders
-0.001 -0.013 0.000 
(0.783) (0.766) (0.179)
-0.003 -0.034 0.000 
(0.441) (0.442) (0.324)
-0.001 -0.02 0.000 
(0.575) (0.693) (0.312)
Table 8 (Continued)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of three measures of insider purchases. “Influential patent” firms consist o f firms with 
influential patents filed during 1987-2006. ”No-influential patent” firms and “inconsequential patent” firms are two control samples.Influential patents are 
identified as those top ten percent most cited patents of the application year in its technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. To construct the 
matched sample of “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample of “influential patent” firms is matched to a control firm-year with the closest 
market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms consists of 
firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited of the application year in its technology sub-category in the NBER 
database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent during the 
sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Insider trading activities are measured during two periods for each 
firm-year: One is the informed period, the year before the application year; the other is the control period, the year a firm applies for a patent. The dependable 
variables include: #shares (number of shares bought by insiders in millions during the year), Sshares (dollar value of shares bought by insiders in millions during 
the year), and %equity (number o f shares bought during a year divided by number o f outstanding shares). The top and bottom one percent o f the observations of 
the dependent variables in each regression are winsorized. Market cap is computed as the number o f common shares outstanding times the share price at the end 
of calendar year before pre-application year or application year. The standard deviation o f stock returns (o) is calculated over the year prior to pre-application 
year or control year. PRET (-1) is the buy-and-hold return for a firm over one year prior to pre-application year or control year. B/M decile is assigned as one to 
ten depending on the firm’s B/M ratio. I use NYSE B/M decile breakpoints to assign a firm’s B/M decile. B/M is calculated as book value of equity divided by 
market value of equity ratio as of the last year ending prior to the pre-application or application year. R&D/Sales ratio is R&D expense to sales revenue for the 
last year before the pre-applying or applying year. Liquidity equals to the mean daily trading volume divided by share outstanding during the pre-applying or 
control year. Pre-apply is a dummy variable equal to one if the insider trading activity occurs during the pre-applying year and zero otherwise. Test statistics are 
calculated using robust variance. Industry and year fixed effect are included in all regressions. Panel A shows coefficient estimates o f regressions o f measures of 
purchases by all corporate insiders. Panel B only reports the coefficient estimates of ‘Pre-apply’ variable for regressions of measures o f purchases by top 
management and by all insiders but blockholders. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one percent, five percent, 
and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Panel B shows regression estimates and p-values of Equation (4) for the level of 
purchases of the other two insider groups: top management and all insiders except for 
large blockholders. For brevity, I only report coefficient estimates of the dummy variable 
‘Pre-apply’. The sample of “influential patent” firms consists of 4,220 observations for 
which all variables in the regressions have available data in CRSP and Compustat, 
corresponding to 2,110 unique firm-years in which at least one influential patent was 
filed. Similarly, the samples of “no-influential patent” firms and “inconsequential patent” 
firms correspond to 2,054 and 1,592 firm-years, respectively.
Consistent with prior studies, Panel A in Table 8 provides evidence that, all 
insiders purchase significantly more stocks when the firm is larger, has a higher stock 
volatility, or has a lower prior stock return. I also find evidence that the level of insider 
purchases is negatively related to R&D expense and liquidity. In all three samples, 
estimated coefficients of the ‘Pre-apply’ variable are negative but not significantly 
different from zero. It indicates, during the year before filing an influential patent, the 
level of insiders’ purchases is not significantly abnormal, relative to their trading level 
during the application year. This pattern remains constant for the other two insider groups 
in Panel B.
Insider Sales
Table 9 reports the regression results of insider sales. The format of Table 9 is 
similar to that of Table 8, except that three measures of insider purchases are replaced by 
the measures of insider sales. In Panel A, the significant determinants of insiders’ sales 
are almost the same as those of their purchases discussed in Panel A of Table 8, except 
that insiders sell significantly less when the firm has a higher valuation.
Table 9
Regressions o f  Insider Sales
Panel A: All insiders' sales
Independent
Variables
A l. “Influential patent” firms A2. ”No-influential patent” firms A3. “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables Dependent variables Dependent variables
#shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity
0.067*** 3.113*** -0.002*** 0.065*** 2.265*** -0.001*** 0.070*** 4.841*** -0.001***
Ln(market cap) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
a 2.593*** 55.583*** -0.014 3.551*** 27.167* 0.035 9.673*** 411.401*** 0.090***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.550) (0.000) (0.060) (0.279) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PRET(-l) 0.031** 1.876*** 0.002*** 0.006 1.140*** 0.001** 0.162*** 12.024*** 0.003***
(0.016) (0.000) (0.001) (0.542) (0.005) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B/M decile -0.011*** -0.205** -0.001*** -0.017*** -0.380*** -0.001*** -0.010*** -0.731*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D/Sales 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001** -0.016 -0.000** -0.001** -0.078* 0.000
(0.957) (0.099) (0.231) (0.037) (0.113) (0.024) (0.035) (0.050) (0.172)
Liquidity 4.660*** 188.299*** 0.223*** 3.982 326.366*** 0.203* 1.527* 47.726 -0.017
(0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.173) (0.000) (0.095) (0.075) (0.329) (0.109)
Pre-apply -0.027* -1.059** -0.002*** -0.022 -0.393 -0.002** -0.004 0.128 -0.000**
(0.050) (0.024) (0.004) (0.281) (0.457) (0.010) (0.842) (0.909) (0.031)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4220 4220 4220 4107 4107 4107 3183 3183 3183
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.203 0.056 0.073 0.141 0.042 0.171 0.191 0.166
Panel B: other insiders' sales
Insider Group
B .l. “Influential patent” firms B.2. ”No-influential patent” firms B.3. “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables Dependent variables Dependent variables
#shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity
Top managers -0.007** -0.211* -0.000*** (0.027) (0.080) (0.007)
-0.005 -0.064 -0.000** 
(0.220) (0.551) (0.011)
0.003 0.137 0.000 
(0.503) (0.607) (0.499)
All insiders but 
blockholders
-0.027** -1.064** -0.002*** 
(0.049) (0.023) (0.004)
-0.022 -0.381 -0.002** 
(0.290) (0.470) (0.011)
-0.004 0.127 -0.000** 
(0.836) (0.910) (0.021)
Table 9 (Continued)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of three measures of insider sales. “Influential patent” firms consist of firms with influential 
patents filed during 1987-2006. ”No-influential patent” firms and “inconsequential patent” firms are two control samples. Influential patents are identified as 
those top ten percent most cited patents o f the application year in its technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. To construct the matched 
sample o f “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample of “influential patent” firms is matched to a control firm-year with the closest market 
capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms consists o f firm- 
years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited o f the application year in its technology sub-category in the NBER 
database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent during the 
sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Insider trading activities are measured during two periods for each 
firm-year: One is the informed period, the year before the application year; the other is the control period, the year a firm applies for a patent. The dependable 
variables include: #shares (number o f shares sold by insiders in millions during the year), Sshares (dollar value of shares sold by insiders in millions during the 
year), and %equity (number of shares sold during a year divided by number of outstanding shares). The top and bottom one percent o f the observations of the 
dependent variables in each regression are winsorized. Market cap is computed as the number o f common shares outstanding times the share price at the end of 
calendar year before pre-application year or application year. The standard deviation of stock returns (a) is calculated over the year prior to pre-application year 
or control year. PRET(-1) is the buy-and-hold return for a firm over one year prior to pre-application year or control year. B/M decile is assigned as one to ten 
depending on the firm’s B/M ratio. I use NYSE B/M decile breakpoints to assign a firm’s B/M decile. B/M is calculated as book value o f equity divided by 
market value of equity ratio as of the last year ending prior to the pre-application or application year. R&D/Sales ratio is R&D expense to sales revenue for the 
last year before the pre-applying or applying year. Liquidity equals to the mean daily trading volume divided by share outstanding during the pre-applying or 
control year. Pre-apply is a dummy variable equal to one if the insider trading activity occurs during the pre-applying year and zero otherwise. Test statistics are 
calculated using robust variance. Industry and year fixed effect are included in all regressions. Panel A shows coefficient estimates o f regressions o f measures of 
sales by all corporate insiders. Panel B only reports the coefficient estimates of ‘Pre-apply’ variable for regressions of measures o f sales by top management and 
by all insiders but blockholders. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent 
levels, respectively.
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As expected, the signs of ‘PRET’ and ‘Liquidity’ variables of their sales are 
opposite to the signs of purchases. For the sample of “influential patent” firms, estimated 
coefficients of the ‘Pre-apply’ variable are significantly negative for all three measures of 
insider sales. On the other hand, estimated coefficients of ‘Pre-apply’ are not significantly 
different from zero for the other two control samples, except for the %equity measure of 
insider sales.
Panel B reports the similar pattern of insider sales for top management and all 
insiders but blockholders. For top managers in “inconsequential patent” firms, even the 
estimated coefficient of %equity measure of insider sales is not significant.
The distinct difference between the sample of “influential patent” firms and 
control samples indicates that, during the pre-application year, the level of insiders’ sales 
is significantly lower, relative to their trading level during the application year for 
“influential patent” firms but not for control firms. This finding supports the notion that 
insiders postpone their planned sales to increase their gains until the filing of influential 
patents, when the market corporates the favorable information into the stock price.
Insider Net Purchases
The net effect of the delay in insiders’ purchases and sales is reported in Table 10. 
After controlling for other determinants of insider trading, the level of net purchases of 
insiders in “influential patent” firms is significantly higher during the pre-application 
year than that during the control year. This conclusion holds for each of three insider 
groups and for each of three measures of the level of insiders’ net purchases.
Table 10
Regressions o f  Insider Net Purchases
Panel A: All insiders' net purchases
Independent
Variables
A. 1 “Influential patent” firms A.2 ”No-influential patent” firms A.3 “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables Dependent variables Dependent variables
#shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity
-0.065*** -2.949*** 0.001*** -0.061*** -2.170*** 0.000 -0.069*** -4.760*** 0.000***
Ln(market cap) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
a -2.036*** -51.862*** 0.038 -2.731*** -25.869* -0.008 -8.954*** 404.614*** -0.058***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.131) (0.002) (0.069) (0.817) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
PRET(-l) -0.032** -1.798*** -0.002*** -0.014 -1.166*** -0.001*** -0.173*** -12.165*** -0.003***
(0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.166) (0.004) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B/M decile 0.010*** 0.189** 0.001*** 0.015*** 0.369*** 0.001*** 0.010*** 0.746*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001)
R&D/Sales 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001** 0.016 0.000* 0.001** 0.077* 0.000
(0.684) (0.145) (0.762) (0.030) (0.136) (0.072) (0.037) (0.056) (0.225)
Liquidity -5.259*** -191.233*** -0.246*** -5.665** -332.803*** -0.269** -1.469* -47.616 0.006
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.027) (0.086) (0.330) (0.610)
Pre-apply 0.024* 0.997** 0.001** 0.015 0.356 0.002* 0.002 -0.144 0.000
(0.087) (0.030) (0.026) (0.455) (0.490) (0.051) (0.894) (0.898) (0.106)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4220 4220 4220 4107 4107 4107 3183 3183 3183
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.200 0.051 0.078 0.144 0.037 0.167 0.188 0.121
Table 10 (Continued)
Panel B: Other insiders' net purchases
B.l.  “Influential patent” firms B.2. ”No-influential patent” firms B.3. “Inconsequential patent” firms
Insider Group Dependent variables Dependent variables Dependent variables
#shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity #shares Sshares %equity
Top managers 0.006** 0.204* 0.000** 0.005 0.069 0.000*** -0.003 -0.139 0.000
(0.048) (0.091) (0.024) (0.209) (0.510) (0.009) (0.471) (0.603) (0.720)
All insiders but 0.024* 1.002** 0.001** 0.014 0.343 0.002* 0.003 -0.143 0.000*
blockholders (0.084) (0.029) (0.025) (0.471) (0.505) (0.053) (0.887) (0.898) (0.080)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions o f three measures of insiders’ net purchases (purchases minus sales). “Influential patent” firms 
consist o f firms with influential patents filed during 1987-2006. ”No-influential patent” firms and “inconsequential patent” firms are two control samples. 
Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents of the application year in its technology sub-category based on the USPTO 
classification. To construct the matched sample o f “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample o f “influential patent” firms is matched to a control 
firm-year with the closest market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample o f “inconsequential 
patent” firms consists of firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited of the application year in its technology sub­
category in the NBER database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any 
influential patent during the sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Insider trading activities are measured 
during two periods for each firm-year: One is the informed period, the year before the application year; the other is the control period, the year a firm applies for 
a patent. The dependable variables include: #shares (net number o f shares bought by insiders in millions during the year), Sshares (net dollar value o f shares 
bought by insiders in millions during the year), and %equity (number of shares bought on the net during a year divided by number of outstanding shares). The top 
and bottom one percent of the observations o f the dependent variables in each regression are winsorized. Market cap is computed as the number of common 
shares outstanding times the share price at the end of calendar year before pre-application year or application year. The standard deviation o f stock returns (a) is 
calculated over the year prior to pre-application year or control year. PRET (-1) is the buy-and-hold return for a firm over one year prior to pre-application year 
or control year. B/M decile is assigned as one to ten depending on the firm’s B/M ratio. I use NYSE B/M decile breakpoints to assign a firm’s B/M decile. B/M 
is calculated as book value of equity divided by market value of equity ratio as of the last year ending prior to the pre-application or application year. R&D/Sales 
ratio is R&D expense to sales revenue for the last year before the pre-applying or applying year. Liquidity equals to the mean daily trading volume divided by 
share outstanding during the pre-applying or control year. Pre-apply is a dummy variable equal to one if the insider trading activity occurs during the pre­
applying year and zero otherwise. Test statistics are calculated using robust variance. Industry and year fixed effect are included in all regressions. Panel A shows 
coefficient estimates of regressions of measures of net purchases by all corporate insiders. Panel B only reports the coefficient estimates o f ‘Pre-apply’ variable 
for regressions of measures of net purchases by top management and by all insiders but blockholders. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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On the other hand, for the two control samples, the level of insiders’ net purchases 
in the pre-application year is not significantly different from those in the control period. 
The finding indicates that the level of stock net purchases of insiders is significantly 
higher due to the lower level of their sales in the pre-application year before filing an 
influential patent, even though the level of their actual purchases does not change. This 
trading pattern is similar to the passive trading pattern of target firms’ insiders before 
takeover announcements in Agrawal and Nasser (2012). There is no evidence of such 
passive trading in two control samples.
Summary and Conclusions
In this study, I empirically examine whether insiders trade shares based on a 
firm’s innovation output, measured by the filing of an influential patent. Using patents as 
a proxy for innovation output, I analyze insiders’ open market trading in a sample of 
2,470 firm-years in which influential patents were filed during the period 1987-2006. We 
define influential patents as those top ten-percent most cited patents of the application 
year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I 
compare the level of insider trading in the sample of “influential patent” firms to the level 
in each of two control samples, an industry-year-size matched sample of “no-influential 
patent” firms and an unmatched sample of “inconsequential patent” firms. I separately 
examine insiders’ purchases, sales and net purchases during the pre-application year (an 
informed period) and the application year (a control period) for each of three samples. 
For each sample, I focus on the open market stock transactions of three groups of 
corporate insiders: all insiders, top management, and all insiders except for large 
blockholders.
In regressions controlling for other factors related to insider trading, I find an 
interesting pattern of insider trading activities for the “influential patent” firms during the 
calendar year before an influential patent is applied for. Insiders in “influential patent” 
firms reduce their purchases in the pre-application year, though not significantly, relative 
to their trading level during the application year. Nevertheless, their net purchases are 
significantly higher for the same period due to the significantly larger reductions in their 
sales. This pattern of passive trading holds true for each insider group and for each of 
three measures of insider trading. I find no such significantly consistent pattern in the 
“no-influential patent” and “inconsequential patent” firms. The passive trading pattern of 
insiders in “influential patent” firms is similar to the findings of Agrawal and Nasser 
(2012) on the trading behavior of target firms’ insiders before takeover announcements.
My findings suggest that managers have strong information advantages in 
discriminating the quality of patents even before the application of patents, and they tend 
to engage in passive insider trading activities only before an influential patent is filed.
CHAPTER TWO
EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION EXERCISES AND OPTION 
GRANTS DURING THE APPLICATION PROCESS 
OF INFLUENTIAL PATENTS
Introduction
Corporate insiders are well known to possess superior information about a firm’s 
future performance, and they may utilize that information advantage to earn private 
benefits. This study empirically investigates whether exercising and awarding executive 
stock options (ESO) are correlated with firms’ innovation output, represented by the 
application of an influential patent. Aboody and Lev (2000) study research and 
development (R&D) expenses, a major innovation input, as a potential source of personal 
gains from insider trading given the relative scarcity of public information on firms’ 
R&D activities and the importance of R&D activities to firms’ profit potential. They 
argue that R&D activities create unique information asymmetries between corporate 
insiders and outside investors, and they find that personal gains from insider trading in 
firms conducting R&D are significantly larger than those in firms with no R&D 
activities. Given the uncertainty and inefficiency of the innovation process, the outcomes 
of innovation, rather than R&D expenditures, provide better information on the 
innovation’s potential economic impact on firms’ future performance. Using patents to 
proxy for innovation output, I hypothesize that patents, especially influential patents
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(patents that are ranked in the top ten percent most cited for the technology sub-category 
in the application year), contribute most to information asymmetry, and that some 
insiders may exploit this asymmetry to earn profits from ESO exercises or option grants.
I explore ESO exercises and option grants during the application process of an 
influential patent for three reasons. First, I focus on ESO exercises and option grants in 
the year prior to the filing date of an influential patent, as insiders have more private 
information during this period when the firm is preparing the patent application after an 
early stage of R&D. Information about influential patents is revealed at different stages to 
different stakeholders (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005). Even in the stage of filing for a 
patent, information about the innovation may be kept confidential until the patent is 
granted since the public disclosure of the patent application is not required (Ahuja, Coff, 
and Lee, 2005). Generally, it takes about two years for a patent application to be granted 
(Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001). Therefore, information asymmetries between 
managers and investors exist during the lengthy process of patent application. The 
information advantage provides managers a long time lag to pursue personal interests 
through conducting insider trading or influencing the timing of option grants. 
Accordingly, I investigate ESO exercises and grants around the filing and granting dates 
of influential patents.
Secondly, I center on influential patents since the significance or value of each 
individual patent varies enormously. Among the large amounts of patents granted in the 
U.S every year,3 only a few are extremely valuable, while many others have 
comparatively little value (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984). To evaluate the significance
3 According to Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), over 150,000 patents are granted by the US Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) every year.
of a firm’s innovation requires expertise in the relevant field and the knowledge of the 
future development of an industry. It is hard for most outsiders who possess little 
knowledge to determine the importance of a firm’s patent. Even when a patent (the 
innovation outcome) is granted with detailed technical information, most outside 
investors would not be able to estimate its economic potential. However, executives who 
are aware of the innovation since its inception (several years) possess large amounts of 
private information. They may have a strong notion of a patent’s ultimate importance as 
early as the stage of preparing for the patent application. Therefore, during a patent’s 
application process, executives may engage in profitable trading activities 
opportunistically since they are better informed than outsiders about the high future value 
of an influential patent.
Thirdly, I concentrate on informed ESO exercises and unscheduled option awards. 
Executives may be more likely to engage in opportunistic option-related activities for 
personal gains than engage in common stock trading when they possess private 
information about the quality of a patent. Exercising ESOs and granting options may be 
motivated by a number of other factors unrelated to private information. It is not easy for 
outsiders to distinguish option exercises and grants likely to be associated with private 
information from those that are not. Therefore, the opportunistic option exercises and 
option awards may receive less attention from the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) than insiders’ open market transactions.
Unlike open market trading, executives lose the time value of money associated 
with the ESO exercise price by exercising options prior to the expiration. However, 
executives may offset this loss with the profits gained from their private information.
Early exercise occurs when the benefits from the private information outweigh the costs 
related with early exercise. Specifically, I exclude the exercises motivated by other 
factors unrelated to private information, such as liquidity, diversification, and dividend 
capture, and exclusively focus on potentially informed exercises which are more likely to 
contain private information. Therefore, compared to insiders’ common stock trading, the 
informed option exercises may be associated more with material information regarding 
future stock price performance. Using the method in Brooks, Chance, and Cline (2012) 
and Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2012), I identify informed option exercises as those 
exercised early, not around a vesting or ex-dividend date, and where the underlying 
shares were immediately sold.
Since most options have an exercise price equal to the stock’s market price at the 
grant date, the timing of stock options awards is crucial enhancing the executives’ option 
value. Executives prefer to receive options on dates when the company stock price is 
relatively low. Previous studies find that managers are aware of the change of their firm’s 
stock price due to innovation (i.e. Ciftci, Lev, and Radhakrishnan, 2011; Barth, Kasznik, 
and McNichols, 2001; Gu, 2005; Ciftici, 2012); therefore, top executives may exploit this 
foresight by influencing the timing of option awards. Most companies have schedules to 
grant options to top executives on roughly the same dates of every year; therefore, it is 
unlikely that executives can influence the timing of these scheduled option grants. The 
unscheduled option grants, however, are more flexible and more likely to contain related 
private information. Following Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2007), I identify an option 
award as unscheduled if it does not occur within one day of the one-year anniversary of 
the prior year’s award date. I hypothesize that corporate executives may be awarded more
unscheduled stock options before the filing of an influential patent when the stock price 
has not appreciated, and may receive less unscheduled stock options after the filing date.
Based on the patents literature, I define an influential patent as one with high 
future citation impact. Trajtenberg (1990) argues that simple patent counts are not 
informative about innovative output. He then claims that citations are a better indicator of 
the value of innovations and thus overcome the limitations of simple counts. An 
influential patent, which may explore a new area of technology, or is the first to find 
solutions to long-standing problems, is the most valuable. When granted, a patent is 
required to cite all previous patents upon which this new technology builds. Influential 
patents are expected to receive more citations in the future since subsequent innovations 
may be built upon the initial technology. Recent studies have shown that citations of a 
patent contain valuation-relevant information and may be used as an accurate measure of 
the patent’s value (see, e.g. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; Gu, 2005; Matolcsy and 
Wyatt, 2008; McGahee, 2011; Pandit, Wasley, and Zach, 2011). Since citations are 
generally received for years after the initial patent is granted and suffer from a truncation 
bias,4 1 measure the impact of a patent by using the total adjusted citations received by 
the patent. Specifically, I define an influential patent as one that is ranked in the top ten 
percent most cited of the application year for the three-digit technology sub-category 
based on the USPTO classification.
4
The older patents have less truncation issue. For example, a patent that was granted in 1999 would have 
much more time to receive citations than a patent created in 2004 because the patent data used in the paper 
ends in 2006. Following Flail, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001,2005), I multiply the number of citations by a 
weighting index to correct for the truncation bias. The index is higher for later years.
Applying patent data compiled from patent filings with the US Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), I 
examine ESO exercises for 654 firm-events, each with an influential patent filed during 
the period 1996-2006, and 654 industry-year-size-performance matched control firm- 
events with non-influential patents filed, both during an informed and a control period. 
The one-year period prior to the filing date of a patent is defined as the informed period, 
and the one-year period following the patent’s filing date is defined as the control period. 
I study the change of the aggregated option exercises by all insiders in a firm during the 
informed period and the control period. The difference-in-differences (DID) methodology 
is used in the analysis.
In regressions of measures of ESO exercises controlling for related factors, I find 
a significant pattern of delayed option exercises from one year before filing the 
influential patent until the year after that. Compared to exercises over the year following 
the filing date of an influential patent, executives significantly reduce their option 
exercises in the informed period. No such pattern of significantly delayed option 
exercises is present in the matched control sample. It is reasonable to assume that 
executives are cognizant that their private information on the potential value of influential 
innovation will gradually be incorporated into the stock price after the filing of a patent. 
Therefore, executives may delay exercising their options until the stock price runs up to 
maximize their stock option compensation. The pattern of reducing ESO exercises before 
an influential patent’s filing date is similar to the evidence from Agrawal and Nasser 
(2012) which indicates insiders of target firms significantly reduce stock sales before 
takeover announcements.
Next, I examine whether executives influence unscheduled option grants with the 
expectation of appreciation in the stock value after an influential patent is filed by the 
firm. I discover no evidence of abnormal option grants around the application date of an 
influential patent. However, when the informed period is redefined as the one-year period 
before granting a patent and the control period as the year after that, I do find that 
executives receive more options in the year before the grant date of an influential patent 
than the year after the grant date. There is no such pattern of option grants in the matched 
control sample. Although the grant date of an influential patent depends upon the review 
process at the USPTO, top executives may be able to forecast the approximate date and 
have more confidence in the potential appreciation of stock price after the announcement 
of the patent being granted. The results are supported by the point I discussed earlier that 
information about a firm’s innovation may be kept confidential until the patent is granted 
(Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005). Consistent with prior studies; I find that executives’ option 
grants coincide with the stock’s price change, which is more significant around the grant 
date than around the filing date of an influential patent. This finding further demonstrates 
that managers have an informational advantage over patent production and they may 
benefit from it through timing unscheduled option awards.
Background on Executive Stock Option Exercises,
Option Grants, Innovation, and Patents
Executive Stock Option Exercises 
Executive stock options have been broadly used as a form of performance based 
incentive compensation to align the long-term interests of shareholders and managers. 
The large amounts of option grants also provide executives with incentives to act
opportunistically to maximize the expected value of their stock and option portfolios. 
Generally, ESOs are non-transferable, non-hedgeable, and have vesting restrictions 
(forfeitable). It is reasonable for risk-averse, wealth-undiversified executives to exercise 
their options early for diversification or liquidity needs. Existing literature mainly 
examines the motives and policies of exercise behavior and provides substantial evidence 
that a considerable number of stock options are exercised early (see, e.g., Ofek and 
Yermack, 2000; Hall and Murphy, 2002; Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon, 2005). Fu and 
Ligon (2010) summarize a number of reasons to optimally exercise an ESO early, such as 
capturing the current intrinsic value by risk-averse executives, diversifying away the 
unsystematic risk associated with an underdiversified portfolio, liquidity needs of 
executives, or insider information. By segregating the private information factor from 
several other motivating factors in early exercises, Brooks, Chance and Cline (2012) find 
that early exercises account for about 94% of all exercises and there is strong evidence 
indicating that executives use private information when exercising their stock options.
One objective of my study is to identify the specific source of insiders’ 
information leading to early exercises of stock options. The majority of previous studies 
investigate the information content of ESO exercises for future returns, but evidence is 
mixed. Considering the regulatory change on the periods of holding exercised options in 
May 1991,5 Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find during 1992-1995, insider exercises are 
preceded by positive stock returns in the weeks prior to exercises, and are not followed 
by negative abnormal stock returns after exercises except for top managers at small firms.
5 Before May 1991, insiders had to hold the stock acquired through option exercise for six months. This 
holding restriction was removed in May 1991, thus insiders have been able to sell acquired shares 
immediately if the options have been hold for at least six months.
They conclude that insiders do not use insider information to time exercises since insiders 
have been able to sell acquired shares immediately. In contrast, Huddart and Lang (2003) 
examine the option exercises by employees at seven firms, and find that when option 
exercises are high, stock returns in the next six months are ten percent lower than when 
option exercises are low. They then argue that the exercise decisions of both executives 
and junior employees contain price-relevant information. Using data between 1996 and 
2005, Brooks, Chance and Cline (2012) also document significantly lower abnormal 
returns following exercises for samples that should be motivated by private information 
than samples that should not. It is broadly accepted that if executives have negative 
information, they would sell shares immediately after exercises, and the stock would 
more likely perform poorly for a period after exercises. In another context, influential 
patents play a significant role in maintaining the firms’ competitive edge and deciding the 
firms’ future value. The filing of an influential patent would signal positive information 
for executives in enhancing the firm’s market performance. One may wonder about the 
pattern of option exercises when executives have positive information on the quality of a 
patent. Therefore, I examine whether corporate executives use private information to time 
the exercises of stock options when the firm has an influential innovation on the way. 
Specifically, I focus on exercises that are identified as potentially informed exercises, 
based on the method used in previous option literature (Brooks, Chance, and Cline, 2012; 
Bradley, Cline, and Lian, 2012).
Option Grants
One key feature of options is that the exercise price of an option is equal to the 
stock’s market price on the grant date. This feature makes the timing of stock options
awards crucial in enhancing the executives’ option value. Executives prefer to receive 
options on dates when the company stock price is relatively low. According to Lie 
(2005), if executives can influence the timing of a grant, they might time it to occur either 
after an expected stock price decrease or before an anticipated stock price increase. 
Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kaszznik (2000) provide evidence that CEOs receive 
stock option awards shortly before the favorable corporate news. Yermack (1997) argues 
that CEOs time option grants before good news or after bad news. Aboody and Kaszznik 
(2000) concentrate on a sample of firms with fixed award schedules and document that 
CEOs manipulate the timing of the news disclosure around scheduled option awards by 
delaying positive information or rushing negative information. Compared with scheduled 
option awards, which occur on nearly identical award dates every year, unscheduled 
option awards provide executives with more flexibility to manipulate and enhance the 
value of their awards. Focusing on a sample of unscheduled awards, Lie (2005) first 
proposes the “backdating hypothesis” to explain the systematically favorable stock price 
patterns surrounding option grant dates documented in earlier studies. Lie reports that the 
predicted returns from the three-factor model are abnormally low before unscheduled 
ESO awards and abnormally high afterward. Other than the “backdating hypothesis”, 
another possible explanation suggested by Lie is that executives might have an 
informational advantage that allows them to develop superior forecasts regarding future 
market movements. When executives have positive information, they may expect future 
price increases and thus influence the unscheduled options to be awarded when a firm’s 
stock price hits a low point.
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More recently, Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011) find that unscheduled options are 
awarded to many target firms’ CEOs during private merger negotiations as a substitute 
for golden parachutes and compensation for the benefits they forfeit because of the 
merger. Their results show that when target CEOs expect large pay losses after the 
merger goes through, their firms are more likely to extend them unscheduled options 
during merger negotiations. Ali, Wei, and Zhou (2011) examine option grant timing in 
response to fire sales and purchases of stocks by mutual funds. Their study illustrates that 
insiders enhance personal benefits by influencing the timing of option grants in response 
to the underpricing of their stock caused by fund-flow-induced price pressure.
Innovation and Patents 
Technological innovation in general brings long-term economic benefits to firms 
(Griliches, 1984, 2000). At the same time, innovation-intensive firms present more severe 
information asymmetries. Ciftci, Lev, and Radhakrishnan (2011) find that, compared 
with low R&D intensity firms which mimic and extend existing technologies, high R&D 
intensity firms which engage in basic research activities are likely to suffer from higher 
information asymmetry. In general, innovation-intensive firms share several common 
features, such as owning a relatively large amount of intangible assets, utilizing more 
resources for technology and innovation, and being more likely to have a fast changing 
technical environment, which increase the difficulty for market participants to accurately 
assess the firm’s future prospects. Because intangible assets typically are unrecognized 
and estimates of their fair values are not disclosed, investors depend more on analyst 
information in R&D-intensive firms (Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols, 2001). However, 
even investors and analysts cannot fully value the implication of enhanced innovation
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capabilities and underestimate future earnings of R&D-intensive firms (Gu, 2005; Ciftici, 
2012). Furthermore, CEOs or top executives in R&D-intensive companies are mostly 
engineers or experts in their field, which increases the difficulty of monitoring by 
shareholders who are without the relevant technology knowledge. Therefore, compared to 
other firms, R&D-intensive firms generally have a less effective and less efficient 
monitoring mechanism, which, accordingly, provides top managers in R&D-intensive 
firms more flexibility to pursue their own interests.
Existing studies have paid little attention to the role of innovation as an important 
source of information asymmetries leading to executives’ personal gains from insider 
trading. Focusing on R&D expenditures, Aboody and Lev (2000) point out that R&D is a 
major contributor to information asymmetry and that some insiders will exploit this 
asymmetry to gain from insider trading. Their findings indicate that insider gains in 
R&D-intensive firms are substantially larger than those in firms without R&D. According 
to Coff and Lee (2003), investors may assume that insider trading reflects managers’ 
attempts to profit from their private information and view managerial trading as a signal 
about the firm’s prospects. They test the relationship between R&D intensity and investor 
responses to announcements of insider-trading events. They find that insider purchases 
generate larger positive stock price reactions for R&D-intensive firms, which indicates 
that insider purchases have greater signaling value to investors in R&D firms.
Patents, an important indicator of innovative output, have been broadly used in 
the literature as a measure of an individual firm’s technological progress. Using patent 
citations to proxy for the economic value of innovation, Pandit, Wasley, and Zach (2011) 
find that a firm’s future operating performance is positively associated with the quality of
patents. Gu (2005) and Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) find similar evidence. After 
analyzing the association between technology competition and bankruptcy, Eisdorfer and 
Hsu (2011) show that technologically innovative firms are less likely to go bankrupt. 
Hsu, Lee, Liu, and Zhang (2011) use a firm’s patent records to measure its innovation 
competitiveness, and find that patenting activities provide valuable incremental 
information to bondholders beyond R&D investments. They report that non-insider 
bondholders use the number of granted patents and associated citations to assess the 
economic value of innovations and to price bonds of patent-owning firms accordingly. 
The conclusion from these studies is that patents provide useful information in evaluating 
a firm’s innovative capability and understanding the relationship between innovation and 
financial performance.
When granted, a patent is required to cite all previous patents upon which this 
new technology builds. Accordingly, an influential patent can represent a platform upon 
which future innovations will be based and is expected to receive more citations in the 
future. These studies have shown that citations contain valuation-relevant information 
and may be used as an accurate measure of the patent’s value. After multiplying the 
number of citations by a weighting index to correct for the truncation bias (Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg, 2001 and 2005), I use total adjusted citations received to measure the 
success and the value of a patent. I identify influential patents as those ranked in the top 
ten percent most cited patents of the application year in its three-digit technology sub­
category based on the USPTO classification.
However, as a source of information asymmetry and an incentive for insider 
trading, patents have received much less attention in existing research. Ahuja, Coff, and
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Lee (2005) study insider trading on knowledge of imminent breakthroughs, and find that 
managers purchase stock well before breakthrough patents are filed. They define 
breakthrough patents as patents which were filed and ranked in the top ten percent most 
heavily cited in their technology subfield. However, their conclusions are based on only 
three years’ patent data from 1988 to 1990. By examining 88 U.S. listed firms with the 
heaviest patenting for the period 1987 to 1998, Rong (2012) finds strong evidence that a 
firm’s insider trading patterns are significant in explaining the unexpected fluctuations in 
patent output when controlling for R&D input effect. Rong’s finding supports the 
argument that management has privileged knowledge about its R&D productivity.
Most related literature focuses on insiders’ common stock transactions. Stock 
transactions, however, are not the only means by which executives can exploit private 
information on innovation. The extensive use of stock options as compensation provides 
executives with another means of exploiting private information on the quality of 
patterns. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to examine ESO exercises 
and option grants around the filing of influential patents.
Sample Selection and Data Description
Sample o f  “ Influential Patent” Firms 
The sample is constructed from several databases. Patent data come from the 
updated National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database, originally 
developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and revised as of August, 2010. ESO 
exercises and option grants data is taken from Thomson Financial Insiders Filings 
database (TFI), which covers the period 1996 to 2007. Stock return and price data is 
gathered from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and financial data is
from Compustat. The NBER database includes detailed information on all patents granted 
by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) during the period 1976 -  2006. Patent 
citations, the key indicator of patent value, suffer from a truncation bias since citations 
are generally received for years after the patent was granted. The patents that were 
granted in early years would have more time to receive citations than those granted in 
more recent years. Thus, each patent’s citation is adjusted by multiplying with a 
truncation weight index, from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), and also found in the 
NBER patent dataset. The NBER data contains the grant dates and the grant years of all 
patents in the file; however, it only contains the application years for patents granted. 
Since I investigate executives’ option exercises and option grants around the filing date 
of an influential patent, I collect the application date for each influential patent from the 
USPTO’s website. The application date is then used as the relevant event time for the 
study of executives’ option behavior.
The initial patent data is constructed using all patents applied for during the 
period 1996-2006, 6 except those missing a unique assignee number, or missing a citation 
truncation weight as of 2006, or with the status ‘M’ (missing) or ‘W’ (withdrawn). 
Specifically, I define influential patents as patents that are ranked in the top ten percent 
most cited of the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category in the NBER 
database, and whose total adjusted citations are not equal to zero. I then eliminate 
observations (influential patents) with firm-years not listed, or which have incomplete 
coverage in CRSP, Compustat, or the TFI insider filings database. To avoid overlap, if a 
firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine the
6 My option data ends in 2007 since the patent data ends in 2006 and I need one year of option exercise 
data after the application of a patent.
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influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years (730 days). This 
method leads to the final sample of 654 influential patents filed by 564 distinct firms. For 
the sample of “influential patent” firms, only one influential patent is included for each 
firm in a single year.
The USPTO continuously updates its classification system (about 400 three-digit 
patent classes) for the patented inventions. The 654 influential patents belong to 216 
patent classes. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) develop a higher-level classification 
and aggregate all the classes into six main categories: Chemical (excluding Drugs); 
Computers and Communications; Drugs and Medical; Electrical and Electronics; 
Mechanical; and Others. Based on their classification, I present the distribution of 
technology classes for the sample of influential patents in Table 11. Average cites and 
adjusted cites (the citation times the truncation weight index) are also provided. More 
than one quarter (28%) of these influential patents belong to the Computers and 
Communications category. They also have the highest average citation count at 22.1 and 
adjusted citation count at 68.95. The remaining influential patents distribute almost 
evenly among the other five categories from 11.3% to 17.4%.
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Table 11
Summary Statistics o f  Influential Patents
Cat.
Code
Category Name # of
influential
patents
Percentage
Count
Average
Cites
Average Cites 
Adjusted for 
Truncations
1 Chemical 78 11.9% 10.44 31.33
2 Computers & Communications 183 28.0% 22.10 68.95
3 Drugs & Medical 99 15.1% 12.17 36.17
4 Electrical & Electronic 114 17.4% 13.37 42.43
5 Mechanical 74 11.3% 13.16 35.64
6 Others 106 16.2% 12.43 34.96
Total 654 100.0% 15.11 45.6
This table provides the distribution of technology classes, average cites, and average adjusted cites for the 
sample of 654 influential patents. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited 
patents of the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO 
classification. I exclude those top ten percent most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. 
To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those 
influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The adjusted cite is computed as 
the citation times the truncation weight index from the NBER patent dataset.
The Cross-Sectional Matched Sample 
A matched control sample is constructed to compare abnormal informed option 
exercise behavior and assess abnormal performance. Since option exercises often follow 
periods of positive performance, for each firm-event in the sample of “influential patent” 
firms, a matched firm is identified according to industry, year, size, and prior firm 
performance. The matched sample of “no-influential patent” firms is required to have 
corresponding data on Compustat and CRSP datasets, with at least one prior-year return 
on CRSP and have stock options available on the TFI filing dataset. The same control 
sample is also used for the comparison of abnormal unscheduled option grants.
To construct the potential matching pool, I first keep firms with patents whose 
citations are ranked below the median value of citations of its three-digit technology class 
in the application year. I then exclude any firm with influential patents filed during the
period 1996 to 2006. For each firm-year in the sample of “influential patent” firms, I 
identify all “no-influential patent” firms in the pool of possible matching firms within the 
same two-digit primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code in the same year. 
Following the matching procedure in Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2012), I then choose a 
matching firm which has an absolute percentage difference of market capitalization less 
than ten percent, and has the minimum absolute percentage difference of prior-year 
returns between the sample and matching firms. If a potential matching firm-year cannot 
be found from the same two-digit SIC industry, I repeat the same procedure on the same 
one-digit SIC industry, then I run the matching process again without the industry 
requirement. If it is still not able to match all firm-years, I relax the restriction on the 
percentage differences of market capitalization to be 100%. For the remaining matching, 
I relax the restriction on the percentage differences of prior-year returns and add the 
requirement for the minimum difference of market capitalization. The matching 
procedures are without replacement. A matching firm may apply for more than one patent 
in the matched year. To construct the sample of “no-influential patent”, one patent with 
the lowest value of citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event, and then I collect 
the application date for each patent from the USPTO’s website. Finally, the matched 
sample of “no-influential patent” firms consists of 654 firm-events, corresponding to 393 
distinct firms. Only one patent is included for each firm in a single year.
Table 12 reports mean and median values of financial and operating 
characteristics for the sample of “influential patent” firms and control sample. Using p- 
values of t-tests and median tests, Table 12 also reports differences in means and in 
medians between “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms.
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Table 12
Descriptive Statistics o f Sample Firms
Mean
(1) (2) ”No-
“Influential influential 
patent” firms patent” firms
p-value
(D-(2)
Median
(1) (2) ”No-
“Influential influential 
patent” firms patent” firms
p-value
(l)-(2)
Firm size
Market value of equity
($ mill.) 2045 2475 0.392 411 401 0.843
Sales ($ mill.) 1362 1789 0.246 216 226 0.710
Total assets ($ mill.) 3255 2489 0.555 267 254 0.755
Firm value ($ mill.) 4678 4184 0.737 568 536 0.843
Stock volatility and Drior returns
o(%) 4.04 4.15 0.356 3.81 3.80 1.000
PRET(-l) (%) 36.82 25.53 0.073 10.00 6.88 0.378
Growth
B/M 0.47 0.50 0.118 0.38 0.41 0.049
Firm value/Total assets 2.88 2.57 0.056 1.90 1.75 0.073
Sales growth rate (%) 15.24 13.17 0.418 8.83 7.74 0.462
Operating performance (%)
OPA(-l) 2.26 -1.10 0.024 8.49 6.28 0.002
OPA(-2) 1.98 -0.92 0.133 8.57 7.81 0.381
OPA(-3) 2.29 1.00 0.556 9.29 8.45 0.281
OPA 1.91 0.04 0.299 8.24 7.42 0.223
Financial leverage
Long-term debt/total
assets 0.14 0.15 0.185 0.07 0.09 0.231
Long-term debt/firm
value 0.09 0.10 0.094 0.03 0.04 0.189
This table provides summary statistics of firm characteristics for the sample of “influential patent” firms 
and control sample. The sample of “influential patent” firms consists of firms with influential patents filed 
during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents of the 
application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I exclude 
those top ten percent most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. To avoid overlap, if a 
firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those influential patents 
whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample of “no-influential patent” firms is the 
industry-year-size-performance matched control sample. The pool for the control sample consists of firms 
with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value of citation of its technology class in the 
application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, 
and did not apply for any influential patent in the sample period. For each “influential patent” firm, 1 
identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit primary SIC code, an absolute 
percentage difference of market capitalization less than ten percent, and the minimum difference of prior- 
year returns in the same year. A firm in the matched sample may apply for multiple patents in the matched 
year. To construct the sample of “no-influential patent”, one patent with the lowest value of citations is 
randomly chosen for each firm-event.
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Table 12 (Continued)
All firms in the two samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Each of the “influential patent” 
and the “no-influential patent” firms consists of 654 firm-events. Market value of equity is measured at the 
end of calendar year prior to the filing date. Firm value equals (book value of total assets -  book value of 
equity + market value of equity). Firm value, sales, total assets, and financial leverage ratios are for the 
fiscal year prior to the application year. Stock return volatility (o) is the standard deviation of stock returns 
over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the application date of a patent. PRET(-l) (prior stock returns) is 
computed as the buy-and-hold returns over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the application date. B/M is 
calculated as book value of equity divided by market value of equity as o f the end of the last calendar year 
before the year applying a patent. Sales growth is defined as [sales(-l)/sales(-5)],/4-l. OPA(t) is the 
operating performance to total assets for year t relative to the application year (t=0). Operation performance 
is operating income before depreciation. OPA is the mean of OPA(t), equal to (OPA(-l)+OPA(-2)+OPA(- 
3))/3. Other than what is stated, all other financial data are from Compustat. The differences in means 
between two samples are tested by two independent samples t-test, and the differences in medians are 
tested by Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test. P-values are reported.
The two samples are comparable in most measures of financial and operating 
characteristics. Measures of firm size, financial leverage and the first two growth 
measures are for the end of the last fiscal year before a patent is filed. All measures of 
firm size indicate that two samples are similar in size, with a mean market capitalization 
(total assets) of $2,045 million ($3,255 million) in “influential patent” firms and $2,475 
million ($2,489 million) in “no-influential patent” firms. The mean daily stock volatility 
in “influential patent” firms is 4.04%, similar to the one in “no-influential patent” firms, 
4.15%. Two growth measures, the B/M ratio and sales growth ratio, show that the growth 
opportunities are similar in the two groups. Measured by operating income before 
depreciation to total assets, the average operating performance over the prior three years 
has no significant difference between the two samples. The measures of financial 
leverage for the two samples are very close as well. The prior stock returns are 
significantly different at ten percent level.
Time-Series Control
For each observation in the sample of “influential patent” firms and the matched 
control sample, I compare the levels of informed option exercises and unscheduled option 
grants during the informed and control periods. The informed period is the one-year 
period before a patent’s filing date (the pre-application period), and the control period is 
the one-year period after that (the post-application period). I examine informed option 
exercises between the pre-application and post-application periods of a patent because, as 
I discussed, generally, insiders exercise their stock options more frequently when the 
stock price is high and less frequently when the stock price is low. With the foresight and 
confidence that the market will gradually realize the economic value of an influential 
patent and incorporate this information into the stock price, executives would like to 
postpone their informed option exercises until the price runs up in the year after an 
influential patent has been filed.
Stock-Price Reaction when an Influential/ 
Inconsequential Patent Is Granted
I verify the positive association between influential patents and the filing firm’s 
future stock performance by examining the stock-price reaction when an influential 
patent is granted. For comparison, I further present corresponding reaction when a non- 
influential patent is granted.
The abnormal return of stock i on day t is computed as:
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where rj and rm are the stock returns for firm i and the market, respectively. The market 
return is the return on the CRSP value-weighted stock index. I then calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for firm i over days (ti, t2) as:
c^ = i> .-  («)
'= '1
Table 13 reports the mean and median values of CARs and the average CARs 
differences for the samples of “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms over 
three windows covering the trading days (-1, +1), (-5, +5) and (-20, +5) around the 
announcement date of a patent being granted (day 0). Since some firms have no available 
return data on CRSP around the patent’s grant date, the observation size for influential 
patents granted (non-influential patents granted) is 649 (641), corresponding to 564 (393) 
applying firms in 654 (654) application firm-events.
Table 13
Stock-Price Reaction when an Injluential/Non-influential Patent Is Granted
Category
Days around announcement
N Mean Median
( - U + 1 ) (-5, +5) (-20, +5) ( - U + 1 ) (-5, +5) (-20, +5)
(1) Influential patents 
granted 649 0.53** 1.33** 1.94** -0.07 0.03 1.05
(p-value) (0.0351) (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.3980) (0.2916) (0.1229)
(2) Non-influential 
patents granted 641 0.30 0.91* 2.50*** -0.11 0.08 0.25*
(p-value) (0.4012) (0.0918) (0.0023) (0.7222) (0.5311) (0.0641)
(1) vs. (2) difference 0.23 0.42 -0.56 0.04 -0.05 0.80
(p-value) (0.5937) (0.5810) (0.6204) (0.8675 (0.8674) (0.3440)
This table reports the mean/median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and average CARs differences for 
three windows around a patent’s granting date (day 0) for the samples of “influential patent” firms and “no- 
influential patent” firms. The sample of “influential patent” firms consists of firms with influential patents 
filed during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents of the 
application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I exclude 
those top ten percent most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero.
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Table 13 (Continued)
To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those 
influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample of “no-influential 
patent” firms is the industry-year-size-performance matched control sample. The pool for the control 
sample consists of firms with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value of citation of its 
technology class in the application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on 
Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent in the sample period. For each 
“influential patent” firm, I identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit 
primary SIC code, an absolute percentage difference of market capitalization less than ten percent, and the 
minimum difference of prior-year returns in the same year. A firm in the matched sample may apply for 
multiple patents in the matched year. To construct the sample o f “no-influential patent”, one patent with the 
lowest value of citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event. All firms in the two samples are listed on 
the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. There are 649 (641) influential patents (non-influential patents) with 
available firms’ return data on CRSP around the grant date, corresponding to 564 (393) applying firms in 
654 (654) application firm-events. For each patent granted, the abnormal return for trading day t is 
calculated as the daily return on the stock minus the value-weighted CRSP index on day t. Both returns 
include dividends. Mean/median and differences values are reported as percentages. The differences in 
means are tested by two independent samples t-test, and the differences in medians are tested by Wilcoxon- 
Mann Whitney test. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one 
percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Over the three trading days (-1, +1), firms with influential patents granted 
experience a positively mean CARs of about 0.53%, which is statistically significant at 
the five percent level, while the mean CARs in firms with non-influential patents granted 
is not significant. Over the longer trading windows of days (-5, +5) and (-20, +5), firms 
with influential patents granted experience positively larger mean CARs of about 1.33% 
and 1.94%, both are statistically significant at the two percent level; firms with non- 
influential patents granted also experience positive mean CARs of about 0.91% and 
2.50%, both are statistically significant. The results show that the stock price reacts 
positively to the news that an influential patent has been granted. The favorite market 
reaction to an influential patent when it is granted additionally suggests that non-public 
information does exist in firms with influential patents for a long period until the granting 
of the patent.
The CARs of firms with influential patents are not significantly higher than those 
of firms with non-influential patents at any reasonable statistical level. As stated, the
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matched control sample of “no-influential patent” firms is selected from the pool of firms 
with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value of citation of its three- 
digit technology class in the application year, and a non-influential patent is randomly 
chosen from patents with the lowest value of citations for each “no-influential” firm- 
event. This randomicity may have led to the insignificant differences between the CARs 
of firms announcing the news of patents being granted.
Long-Run Stock Performance 
Next, I compare the long-run stock performance of the sample of “influential 
patent” firms and the matched control sample without any influential patent filed in the 
sample period. The standard Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is used to 
estimate the long-run abnormal returns for firms in each sample:
R , - R F , = a  + frMKTRF, + J32HML, + 03SMBt + s , , (7)
where R, is the monthly stock return for a firm, RFt is the monthly risk-free rate, Rr  RFt
is the excess return, MKTRF, is the excess return on the market, measured as the value- 
weighted market return minus the risk-free rate, HML, (High Minus Low) is the average 
return on the two highest value (high book-to-market) portfolios minus the average return 
on the two highest growth (low book-to-market) portfolios, and SMBt (Small Minus Big) 
is the average return on the three smallest capitalization portfolios minus the average 
return on the three biggest capitalization portfolios. The alpha (a) coefficient represents 
the difference between the predicted monthly returns by the three factors and the actual 
monthly returns, so alpha is viewed as the long-run abnormal return.
Table 14 reports the average long-run abnormal returns and the average return 
differences between the sample of “influential patent” firms and the control sample in 36
months after the filing month (month 0). For the first year following the application 
month (month one to 12), the abnormal returns of “influential patent” firms and “no- 
influential patent” firms are not significantly different at 1.07% and 1.18%, respectively. 
The control firms even have a significant and higher average abnormal return than 
“influential patent” firms. However, when investors hold the stock for a longer time, 
“influential patent” firms outperform the control firms. For two or three years following 
the application month (month one to 24 or month one to 36), the mean abnormal returns 
for “influential patent” firms are 1.79% and 1.64%. Both are significant at one percent 
level and higher than those for the control firms, though the returns difference in the 
months (1,24) is not significant.
Table 14
Long-Run Stock Performance
Month N
Mean long-run abnormal returns (%) Returns Difference (%)
(1) “Influential 
patent” firms
(2) "No- 
influential patent” 
firms
( D - ( 2 ) t-stat
(1,12) 654 1.07 1.18*** -0.11 -0.14
(1 ,2 4 ) 654 1.79*** 1.49*** 0.3 1.25
(1 ,3 6 ) 654 1.64*** 1.31*** 0.33 1.78*
This table reports the mean long-run abnormal returns and the average return difference between the 
sample of “influential patent” firms and the control sample of “no-influential patent” firms in 36 months 
after the filing month (month 0). The sample of “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential 
patents filed during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents 
of the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I 
exclude the top ten percent most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. To avoid overlap, 
if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those influential patents 
whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample of “no-influential patent” firms is the 
industry-year-size-performance matched control sample. The pool for the control sample consists of firms 
with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value of citation o f its technology class in the 
application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, 
and did not apply for any influential patent in the sample period. For each “influential patent” firm, I 
identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit primary SIC code, an absolute 
percentage difference of market capitalization less than ten percent, and the minimum difference of prior- 
year returns in the same year. A firm in the matched sample may apply for multiple patents in the matched 
year. To construct the sample of “no-influential patent” with filing dates, one patent with the lowest value 
of citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event.
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Table 14 (Continued)
All firms in the two samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Each sample consists of 654 
firm-events. The standard Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is used to estimate the long-run 
abnormal returns for firms based on their monthly returns data on CRSP. Mean values and returns 
differences are reported as percentages. The differences in means are tested by two independent samples t- 
test. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively.
The evidence that “influential patent” firms have better long-run performance 
than “no-influential patent” firms supports the long-term effect of influential 
technological innovation on firms’ future development. This evidence, together with the 
stock-price reaction evidence, supports my definition of influential patents in that those 
technologies are influential and may signal future economic performance of firms.
ESO Exercise Data
ESO exercises data is obtained from the Thomson Financial Insiders Filings Data 
Files (TFI, September, 2007). The data files capture all insider activities as reported on 
Form Three, Four, Five and 144 filed with the SEC.7 Focusing on Form Four in the 
Table Two of the TFI database, I consider two codes of option exercise transactions, M 
(‘exercise of in-the money or at-the-money derivative security acquired pursuant to Rule 
16b-3 plan’) and X (‘exercise of in-the-money or at-the-money derivative security’), for 
each “influential patent” and control firm during the pre-application and post-application 
periods. I drop filings marked as inaccurate or incomplete by TFI (Cleanse Indicators as 
‘S’ or ‘A’), filings labeled as an amendment to an earlier filing (Amendment Indicator as 
‘A’), or transactions that involve shares indirectly owned by insiders via a partnership,
7 Most insider transactions are reported on Form Four. Form Three is the initial statement of beneficial 
ownership that insiders must file. Form Five reports annual changes in beneficial ownership and contains 
activity from small or exempt transactions that are not reported on Form Four. Form 144 declares their 
intention to sell restricted shares.
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corporation, trust or other entity (Ownership Type as ‘I’). Moreover, I require that the 
security titles must include “option” except for “put option”, and that the underlying 
security is common shares. The exercised stock options are reported both on the Table 
One and Table Two files on TFI, but some numbers of underlying shares exercised are 
not consistent. To reduce noise, I exclude those records with inconsistent numbers of 
underlying shares exercised in two tables.
Next, I aggregate the transactions recorded on the same document with the same 
exercise price, transaction date, vesting date, and expiration date by the same person, 
since TFI reports multiple option exercises with the same exercise price on the same day 
by a single manager as distinct transactions. These transactions are then analyzed as a 
single exercise. I drop such exercise transactions involving less than ten shares, more 
than 100% of firm’s shares outstanding, or where the exercise price is less than one cent 
or more than 1,000 dollars. This action leaves 411,041 ESO exercises.
The option exercise transactions of all corporate insiders are examined. Following 
prior studies, I utilize two measures to examine the level of option exercises: 1) the 
number of underlying shares exercised and sold immediately by executives during a year 
(#underlying-shares) and, 2) the in-the-money value of exercises during a year ($option). 
The in-the-money value of exercise is the difference between the stock and exercise 
prices multiplied by the number of shares exercised. The later measure (in-the-money 
value of exercise) is related more to the executives’ gains through early exercising and 
has been commonly used in the literature related to option exercises.
As discussed above, options may be exercised for liquidity, diversification, 
maturity, or other rational reasons. For the purpose of this study, it is crucial to divide
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option exercises as uninformed or informed and to focus only on those potentially 
informed option exercises. Following Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2012), I identify 
uninformed ESO exercises as those exercised within 30 days after the vesting date, within 
30 days before the maturity date, within 30 days before the ex-dividend date, or those 
underlying shares held in the executives’ portfolio following the exercise. Informed 
exercises are defined as the complement of the above uninformed exercises. To increase 
the sample size, I further treat those exercises with missing relative dates as informed. I 
match option exercises in Table Two with open market sales in Table One to make sure 
that all underlying shares were immediately sold upon exercise. In this way, 160,810 
informed ESO exercises are identified over the period 1996 to 2007, where the 
underlying shares were immediately sold. If a firm has no stock option exercised over the 
informed or control periods, zero is assigned to the measures of option exercises. The 
informed ESO exercises data is then merged with Compustat, CRSP, and patent data.
ESO Grants Data
ESO grants data is extracted from the TFI Filings Data Files as well. Focusing on 
Form Four in the Table Two of TFI database, I consider transactions with code “A” 
(grant or award) for each “influential patent” and control firm during the informed and 
control periods. Similar with the process of data clean for option exercises, I drop filings 
marked as inaccurate or incomplete by TFI, filings labeled as an amendment to an earlier 
filing, or transactions that involve shares indirectly owned by insiders. I also require that 
the security titles must include “option” except for “put option”, and that the underlying 
security is common shares. I then aggregate the filings of grants that are awarded in a 
given company on a given date. These transactions are analyzed as a grant event. This
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aggregation leaves 113,099 grant events by 11,321 distinct firms during the period 1996 
to 2007. I use the total number of underlying shares granted in a given grant event 
(#underlying-shares) to measure the level of option grants.
Most companies have schedules to grant options to top executives on roughly the 
same dates of every year. Since the scheduled grants are unlikely to be timed 
opportunistically, the extant literature generally separates scheduled grants from other 
grants. Following Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2007), I use a tightened definition to 
categorize the scheduled grants that are excluded from further analysis. I identify an 
option award as unscheduled if it does not occur within one day of the one-year 
anniversary of the prior year’s award date. An unscheduled option grant is excluded if it 
has unavailable or incomplete Compustat, CRSP, or patent data. This method yields a 
final sample of 3,348 unscheduled grants from 4,434 option grant events over the period 
1996 -  2007. If a firm did not award any option over the informed or control periods, I 
assign zero to the measure of option grants.
Results of Informed Option Exercises
Following the method used in Agrawal and Nasser (2012), I compare the level of 
informed option exercises in “influential patent” firms during the one-year pre­
application period under two sets of controls: the time-series control and the cross- 
sectional control. The time-series control examines informed option exercises in 
“influential patent” firms over the informed and control periods. It perfectly controls for 
firm characteristics, but does not control for possible changes in the exercise behavior of 
executives over time. The cross-sectional control investigates informed option exercises 
by executives of both “influential patent” and control firms over the same period. It
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emphasizes the opposite trade-off by controlling for the effect of the time period and 
omitting firm attributes which may affect the level of option exercises. While each 
control has its benefits and limitations, I focus on the dual-control, which equals the 
abnormal exercises by executives in “influential patent” firms between the pre­
application and control periods minus the abnormal exercises by executives in control 
firms between the pre-application and control periods. Using this difference-in- 
differences (DID) approach, both the effects of firm characteristics and the time period 
are controlled.
Univariate Results
Table 15 provides mean and median values of two measures of executives’ option 
exercises for the sample of “influential patents’ firms and control sample during the 
informed and control periods. The informed period is the one-year period prior to a 
patent’s filing date and control period is the one-year period after that. The two measures 
of option exercises are: number of underlying shares exercised and sold immediately by 
executives during a year (#underlying-shares) and in-the-money value of exercises during 
a year (Soption). The in-the-money value of exercises is the difference between the stock 
and exercise prices multiplied by the number of shares exercised.
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Table 15
Univariate Test: Informed Option Exercises
All insiders
Statistic Influential patents Non-influentialpatents p-values
ESO exercise 
measures
0 )
Informed
period
(2)
Control
period
(3)
Informed
period
(4)
Control
period
0H 2) d)-(3) (3)-(4) (1-2)-(3-4)
mean
#underlying-shares 30.14 51.14 32.02 43.05 0.000 0.737 0.055 0.200
Soption 825.44 1997.58 865.21 1000.35 0.004 0.816 0.468 0.019
median
#underlying-shares 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.527 0.005 0.165
Soption 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.374 0.017 0.078
This table reports the mean and median values of two measures of executives’ informed option exercises 
for the sample of “influential patent” firms and the control sample of “no-influential patents’ firms during 
the informed and control periods. The informed period is the one-year period before a patent’s filing date 
and control period is the one-year period after that The sample of “influential patent” firms consist o f firms 
with influential patents filed during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent 
most cited patents of the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO 
classification. I exclude those top ten percent most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. 
To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those 
influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample of “no-influential 
patent” firms is the industry-year-size-performance matched control sample.. The pool for the control 
sample consists of firms with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value of citation of its 
technology class in the application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on 
Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent in the sample period. For each 
“influential patent” firm, I identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit 
primary SIC code, an absolute percentage difference of market capitalization less than ten percent, and the 
minimum difference of prior-year returns in the same year. A firm in the matched sample may apply for 
multiple patents in the matched year. To construct the sample o f “no-influential patent”, one patent with the 
lowest value of citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event. All firms in the two samples are listed on 
the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Informed ESO exercises are identified as those exercised not within 30 
days after the vesting date, not within 30 days before the maturity date, not within 30 days before the ex- 
dividend date, and those underlying shares not held in the executives’ portfolio following the exercise. The 
two measures of executives’ option exercises are: #underlying-shares (number of underlying shares 
exercised by executives in thousands during a year) and Soption (in-the-money value of exercise in 
thousands during a year). All insiders’ informed option exercise is from TFI Filings database. The 
differences in means are tested by two-tailed matched-pair t-tests, and the differences in medians are tested 
by Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. The p-values of differences are also reported.
Table 15 also reports p-values of the paired t-tests and Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests for the mean and median differences in the measures of informed option exercises
between “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms. Column (l)-(2) (Column
(3)-(4)) shows p-values of test statistics for the change in the level of informed option 
exercises for executives in “influential patent” firms (“no-influential patent” firms) 
between the informed and control periods (i.e., the time-series control); Column (l)-(3) 
shows p-values for the differences in the level of informed option exercises for 
executives in the informed period between “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” 
firms (i.e., the cross-sectional control); and Column (l-2)-(3-4) is for the differences 
between (a) the changes in the level of informed ESO exercises in “influential patent” 
firms between the informed and control periods and (b) the changes in the level of 
informed ESO exercises in “no-influential patent” firms between the informed and 
control periods (i.e., DID).
Based on the time-series control, Column (l)-(2) shows that executives in 
“influential patent” firms exercise significantly fewer options and gain less in-the-money 
value of exercises during the informed period than they do during the control period at 
statistical one percent level; Column (3)-(4) indicates that the in-the-money value of 
options exercised by executives in the control firms have no significant change during the 
informed period and control period. The comparisons from cross-sectional control 
(Column (l)-(3)) suggest no significant difference in the level of informed option 
exercises between the two samples over the informed period. According to the DID 
control, Column (l-2)-(3-4) implies that, the in-the-money value of exercises increases 
from the pre-application period to the control period for both samples, but the increase in 
“influential patent” firms is significantly larger than the change in control firms.
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Cross-Sectional Regressions 
The results from univariate tests provide some preliminary evidence under the 
time-series or DID controls; however, univariate tests do not control for other 
determinants of the level of informed option exercises. Next, I estimate cross-sectional 
regressions when controlling for other determinants of the normal level of informed 
option exercises.
Regression Specification
To some extent, the insider behavior of exercising ESOs and selling the acquired 
shares is similar with insiders’ open market sales; therefore, ESO exercises may be 
influenced by the similar factors related to insider sales, including firm size, the level of 
stock volatility, prior stock performance, stock liquidity, firm valuation, and innovation. I 
attempt to control for these various factors in the cross-sectional regressions, for 
“influential patent” and control firms. Two models are constructed to examine my 
predictions. Equation (8) is for the time-series control for “influential patent” firms or 
control firms only. For Equation (8), all explanatory variables for both the “influential 
patent” firm and the matched control firm include two observations: One is for the one- 
year pre-application (informed) period, and the other is for the control period. A binary 
dummy variable labeled Pre-apply equals one if the exercise activity occurs during the 
pre-application period and zero otherwise. Equation (9) is for the DID control for 
“influential patent” firms and control firms together. For Equation (9), all explanatory 
variables for each firm-event include four observations: Two observations for “influential 
patents’ firm (for the pre-application and control periods) and two for the control firm 
(for the pre-application and control periods). Influential-patent is a dummy variable equal
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to one if the firm has an influential patent filed and equal to zero otherwise. The main 
explanatory variables are Pre-apply, Influential-patent, and Pre-apply* Influential-patent. 
Coefficients of the first two variables estimate the abnormal level of informed exercises 
related to the time-series and cross-sectional controls, respectively. The coefficient of 
interaction term estimates abnormal informed exercises under the DID control. The two 
models and each measure of the control variables are described below:
ESO, =a0 + fi] Ln(Market_ Cap), + P2a, + P3PRETU + PAB / Mdecile, + PSR & D / Salest
(°)+ P6Liquidit)j + /?7 Pre_applyt + e,,i = 1,2,...
ESQ = + PfrfMarketCap, + /?2er +P3PRETh +PAB/M_decil?+P5R&D/Sale$
+P6Liquidity\-Pj Pre apply+PiInfluentia_patenfi-P) Preapply^ Influentia_patentr£,, (9) 
1 =  1,2,...
Firm size (Ln(Market Cap)): Seyhun (1986) finds that insiders are likely to be net 
sellers in large firms. Fu and Ligon (2010) provide evidence that executives in large firms 
are more likely to exercise in-the-money ESOs within two days of the vesting date. I use 
the natural logarithm of the market capitalization to control firm size. Market cap is 
computed as the number of common shares outstanding times the share price as of the 
ending last calendar year prior to the beginning of the informed or control period on 
CRSP monthly dataset.
Stock volatility (a): Meulbroek (2000) finds that insiders in those more risky 
companies tend to sell equity more actively. I measure the risk of a stock by the standard 
deviation of stock returns of a firm over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the beginning 
of the informed or control period on CRSP daily data.
Prior stock performance (PRET.p : Lakonishok and Lee (2001) argue that insiders 
tend to sell stocks when the past returns are high. Prior stock returns (PRET.i) are
computed as the buy-and-hold return for a firm over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the 
beginning of the informed or control period.
Firm valuation (B/Mdecile): Jenter (2005) finds that insiders are more likely to 
sell a stock when the firm has a high valuation. Book-to-market (B/M) ratio is often used 
to measure a firm’s valuation ratio relative to other firms. The B/M ratio is computed 
from dividing the book value of equity divided by the market capitalization of common 
shares outstanding as of the last calendar year ending prior to the informed or control 
period. Based on NYSE B/M decile breakpoints in a given year, B/M decile is assigned 
to one to ten depending on a firm’s B/M ratio.
Innovation (R&D/Sales): Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that information 
asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside investors are more severe in R&D- 
intensive firms, and find that insider gains in firms conducting R&D are significantly 
larger than those in firms with no R&D activities. R&D/Sales ratio is computed as R&D 
expenses to sales revenue for the last fiscal year ending prior to the informed or control 
period. I treat R&D expenses as zero if R&D expenses are missing on Compustat.
Stock liquidity: Prior studies (i.e., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985; 
Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) suggest that informed traders are more likely to trade when 
stock liquidity is higher. Stock liquidity is calculated as the mean daily trading volume 
divided by shares outstanding during one year prior to the informed or control period.
Pre-apply: A binary dummy variable equal to one if the executives’ exercise 
activity occurs during the pre-application period and zero otherwise.
Influential-patent: A binary dummy variable equal to one if a firm has an 
influential patent and zero otherwise.
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By controlling for those factors related to option exercises, I compare the 
regressions’ results between “influential patent” and control firms. The dependent 
variable (ESO) is one of the two measures of option exercises: number of underlying 
shares exercised and sold immediately by executives during a year (#underlying-shares) 
and in-the-money value of exercises during a year (Soption). Test statistics is calculated 
using robust variances in each regression model.
Informed ESO Exercises
Informed ESO exercises are illustrated in Table 16. Using Equation (8), Panel 
16.1 and 16.2 show the coefficient estimates and p-values of the regressions of two 
measures of executives’ option exercises in “influential patent” and control firms. Panel 
16.3 presents the coefficient estimates and p-values from the regressions using Equation 
(9). My main interest is in the coefficients of Pre-apply, Influential-patent, and Pre- 
apply^* Influential-patent. The sample of “influential patent” firms consists of 1,196 
observations for which all the variables in the regressions have available data in CRSP 
and Compustat, corresponding to 598 unique firm-events in which an influential patent 
was filed. Similarly, the sample of “no-influential patent” firms consists of 1,293 
observations, corresponding to 647 firm-events with a non-influential patent filed.
Consistent with prior studies in insider sales, Table 16 provides evidence that 
executives exercise significantly more stock options when the firm is large, has a high 
stock volatility, has a high prior stock return, has a high liquidity, or has a low B/M ratio. 
In the sample of “influential patent” firms (Panel 16.1), all estimated coefficients of the 
‘Pre-apply’ variable are significantly negative. In contrast, none of the estimated 
coefficients of ‘Pre-apply’ is significantly different from zero for the control firms (Panel
16.2). Panel 16.3 provides consistent results using the DID control. The positive and 
significant coefficients of variable “Influential-patent” imply that executives in 
“influential patent” firms generally exercise more options and have higher in-the-money 
value of exercises than those in control firms. However, the significantly negative 
coefficients of the interaction term, Pre-apply* Influential-patent, suggest that, the in-the- 
money value of exercises in “influential patent” firms is significantly lower during the 
one-year pre-application period, relative to either the level during its control period or the 
level in control firms.
Table 16
Regressions o f Informed Option Exercises
Table 16 Continued
6.1 “Influential patent” firms 6.2 ”No-influential patent” firms 6.3 Difference in differences
Independent Dependent variables Dependent variables Dependent variables
Variables #underlyi
ng-shares Soptions
((underlying
-shares Soptions
#underlyi
ng-shares Soptions
#underlyin
g-shares Soptions
#underly
ing-
shares
Soptions #underlying-shares Soptions
Pre-apply -19.25** -1123.05** -15.79** -1020.05** -10.98 -134.01 -10.48 -138.52 -10.98 -134.01 -10.13 -116.81
(0.014) (0.018) (0.033) (0.022) (0.116) (0.517) (0.119) (0.470) (0.116) (0.516) (0.133) (0.550)
Influential-patent
7.94
(0.340)
991.75**
(0.035)
6.38
(0.428)
955.71**
(0.047)
Pre-apply
♦Influential- -8.27 -989.04* -5.69 -937.87*
patent
(0.427) (0.052) (0.575) (0.064)
Ln(market cap)
27.33*** 1371.75*** 16.49*** 533.42*** 22.04*** 947.13***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0 865.60***
(0.001)
54367.12**
(0.034)
555.42***
(0.002)
14654.84**
(0.013)
746.43***
(0.000)
35483.21***
(0.008)
PRET(-l) 8.20*
(0.064)
626.43**
(0.034)
8.98*
(0.100)
744.18***
(0.001)
8.65**
(0.013)
696.39***
(0.000)
B/M decile -2.36**
(0.015)
-66.33
(0.129)
-2.69***
(0.009)
-64.65***
(0.006)
-2.52***
(0.000)
-66.18***
(0.006)
R&D/Sales 0.00
(0.170)
-0.18
(0.235)
-0.06
(0.125)
-1.72
(0.373)
-0.00
(0.949)
-0.20
(0.158)
Liquidity 632.02
(0.143)
4318.22
(0.819)
1767.37***
(0.003)
54008.63***
(0.002)
970.24**
(0.011)
20902.69
(0.146)
Constant 50.94*** 1990.96*** -149.12*** -8507.09*** 43.00*** 999.21*** -84.99*** -3166.61*** -121.15*** -6271.18***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1276 1276 1196 1196 1308 1308 1293 1293 2584 2584 2489 2489
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.004 0.129 0.082 0.001 - 0.000 0.095 0.145 0.003 0.004 0.111 0.087
00
Table 16 (Continued)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of two measures o f  executives’ informed option exercises on several explanatory variables. The 
sample o f “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential patents filed during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent 
most cited patents of the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I exclude those top ten percent most cited 
patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those 
influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample o f “no-influential patent” firms is the industry-year-size-performance 
matched control sample. The pool for the control sample consists of firms with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value o f citation o f its 
technology class in the application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any 
influential patent in the sample period. For each “influential patent” firm, I identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit primary 
SIC code, an absolute percentage difference o f market capitalization less than ten percent, and the minimum difference o f prior-year returns in the same year. A 
firm in the matched sample may apply for multiple patents in the matched year. To construct the sample of “no-influential patent”, one patent with the lowest 
value of citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event. All firms in the two samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Informed ESO exercises 
are identified as those exercised not within 30 days after the vesting date, not within 30 days before the maturity date, not within 30 days before the ex-dividend 
date, and those underlying shares not held in the executives’ portfolio following the exercise. Executives’ informed option exercises activities are measured 
during two periods for each firm-event: One is the informed period, one-year before a patent’s filing date; the other is the control period, one-year period after a 
firm applies for a patent. The dependable variables include #underlying-shares (number o f underlying shares exercised and sold by executives in thousands 
during a year) and Soption (in-the-money value of exercise in thousands during a year). All insiders’ option exercise data is from Thomson Insiders Filings 
database. Market cap is computed as the number o f common shares outstanding times the share price as of the last calendar year ending prior to the beginning of  
the informed or control period. The standard deviation of stock returns (o) is calculated over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the beginning of the informed or 
control period. PRET (-1) is the buy-and-hold return for a firm over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the beginning o f the informed or control period. B/M decile 
is assigned as one to ten depending on the firm’s B/M ratio. I use NYSE B/M decile breakpoints to assign a firm’s B/M decile. B/M is calculated as book value 
of equity divided by market value of equity ratio as o f the last calendar year ending prior to the informed or control period. R&D/Sales ratio is R&D expense to 
sales revenue for the last fiscal year ending prior to the informed or control period. Liquidity equals to the mean daily trading volume divided by share 
outstanding during one year prior to the informed or control period. “Pre-apply” is a dummy variable equal to one if  the executives’ informed option exercises 
activity occurs during the informed period and equal to zero otherwise. “Influential-patent” is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an influential patent 
filed and equal to zero otherwise. Test statistics are calculated using robust variance. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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The distinct difference between the sample of “influential patent” and control 
firms indicates that executives in the “influential patent” firms exercise significantly 
fewer stock options over the pre-application period than over the post-application period. 
This finding supports the view that executives delay their planned exercises to increase 
their stock option compensation until after the filing of the influential patent, when the 
firm’s stock price runs up.
Results of Unscheduled Option Grants
Using the similar method of analyzing the level of executives’ informed option 
exercises, I compare the level of unscheduled option grants in “influential patent” firms 
during the informed period under two sets of controls: the time-series control and the 
cross-sectional control. I focus on the dual-control to control for both effects of firm 
characteristics and time period. Following previous analysis, I first use the same way to 
define the informed and control periods, but I do not find any abnormal pattern of 
unscheduled option grants during the informed period (the results are not reported). I 
examine unscheduled option grants over the one-year period before the grant date of an 
influential patent (name the pre-grant period as the informed period). I do discover strong 
evidence of abnormal option grants around the date when an influential patent is granted 
by the patent office.
Univariate Results
Table 17 provides mean and median values of the measure of executives’ option 
grants for the sample of “influential patents’ firms and the control sample during the 
informed and control periods. The format of Table 17 is similar to that of Table 15,
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except that 1) the measures of informed option exercises are replaced by the measure of 
unscheduled option grants and, 2) the informed period indicates the one-year period 
before a patent’s grant date. I use the total number of underlying shares granted in a given 
grant event (#underlying-shares) to measure the level of option grants.
Table 17
Univariate Test: Unscheduled Option Grants
Statistic Influential patents Non-influentialpatents p-values
ESO grants 
measures
(1)
Informed
period
(2)
Control
period
(3)
Informed
period
(4)
Control
period
(l)-(2) (l)-(3) (3)-(4) (1-2)-(3-4)
mean
#underlying-shares 374.45 307.89 284.17 334.84 0.093 0.036 0.225 0.036
median
#underlying-shares 75.04 114.33 78.17 75.37 0.553 0.927 0.465 0.728
This table reports the mean values of the measure of executives’ unscheduled option grants for “influential 
patent” firms and “no-influential patents’ control firms during the informed and control periods. The 
sample of “influential patent” firms consist of firms with influential patents filed during 1996-2006. 
Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents of the application year in its 
three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I exclude those top ten percent 
most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple 
influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those influential patents whose filing dates are 
separated by at least two years. The sample of “no-influential patent” firms is the industry-year-size- 
performance matched control sample. The pool for the control sample consists of firms with patents whose 
citations are ranked below the median value o f citation o f its technology class in the application years. 
Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply 
for any influential patent in the sample period. For each “influential patent” firm, I identify a “no- 
influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit primary SIC code, an absolute percentage 
difference of market capitalization less than ten percent, and the minimum difference of prior-year returns 
in the same year. A firm in the matched sample may apply for multiple patents in the matched year. To 
construct the sample of “no-influential patent”, one patent with the lowest value of citations is randomly 
chosen for each firm-event. All firms in the two samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. 
The informed period is the one-year period before a patent’s grant date and control period is the one-year 
period after that. An option award is categorized as unscheduled if it does not occur within one day of the 
one-year anniversary of the prior year’s award date. The measure of executives’ unscheduled option grants 
is: #underlying-shares (number of underlying shares granted to executives in thousands during a year). All 
insiders’ option grants data is from TFI Filings database. The differences in means are tested by two-tailed 
matched-pair t-test. The p-values of differences are reported in the table.
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Based on the time-series control (Column (l)-(2)), firms with influential patents 
award significantly more options over the pre-grant period than over the post-grant 
period. Oppositely, firms with non-influential patents award fewer options over the pre­
grant period than over the post-grant period, though the difference is not significant. 
Based on the cross-sectional control (Column (l)-(3)), firms with influential patents 
award significantly more stock options than control firms during the same informed 
period. According to the DID control, p-value 0.036 in Column (l-2)-(3-4) indicates that, 
from the pre-grant period to the post-grant period, a) firms with influential patents 
decrease the total number of stock options they award; b) the control firms increase the 
amount of stock options awarded; and 3) the difference between the changes in (a) and 
(b) significantly differ from zero at five percent level.
Table 17 provides evidence that firms award more options to their executives before 
the grant of influential patents and fewer after that. This finding is consistent with the 
point that executives may time an option grant to occur before an anticipated stock price 
appreciation. The significant difference in the dual control may be explained as top 
executives are able to forecast the approximate date of granting an influential patent, and 
executives then time option grants to occur with the expectation that the stock price will 
increase after the news of granting is announced.
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
The probability of option grants is also significantly influenced by some of the 
firm characteristics. Smith and Watts (1992) find that large firms and growth firms are 
significantly more likely to use option grants as part of their incentive contracts. 
Therefore, I control for the lagged value of the firm’s market capitalization
{Ln(MarketCap)) and book to market ration {B/Mdecile). According to prior studies 
(Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kaszznik, 2000; Lie, 2005), previous stock return (PRET.j) 
is included to control for managerial manipulation of grants’ issue-dates around local 
minimum returns. Since Yermack (1995) finds that liquidity-constrained firms appear to 
provide a great fraction of CEO compensation from stock options, I further control for 
stock liquidity in the regressions. Following Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011), who find 
positive relation between the prior year return volatility and probability of granting 
unscheduled options, I use the standard deviation of prior stock returns to control for the 
risk of a stock {volatility o). Finally, innovation is controlled for using the measure of 
R&D/Sales ratio since Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that R&D activities create unique 
information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside investors. All variables 
are computed in the same way as examining ESO exercises. The two models used in this 
section are:
Award, = a0 + f5xLr{Market_Cap), + /?2or + j33PRETh + fi4B/M_decilq + /3SR& D! Sales,  ^j ^
+ (3bLiquidity+?re_grant, +s„i = 1,2,...
A w a r +/?, LriMarketCafi, +(32a, +/32PRETh +/34Bl M_decil?+f3sR&D/ Sale?
+/3bLiquidity¥/31 Pre_granf+f3iInfluentia_patenfi- fa Pre_granfInfluentia_patenfi-£„ (11)
/= 1,2, -
Equation (10) is used for the time-series control for “influential patent” firms or 
control firms only. The binary dummy variable Pre-grant equals one if an award occurs 
during the pre-grant period and zero otherwise. Equation (11) is used for the DID control 
for “influential patent” firms and control firms together. Influential-patent is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm has an influential patent filed and equal to zero 
otherwise. The main explanatory variables are Pre-grant, Influential-patent, and Pre­
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grant* Influential-patent. The dependent variable (Award) is the number of underlying 
shares granted to executives in a firm during a year (#underlying-shares). I control for 
industry and year fixed effects and calculate test statistics using robust variances in each 
regression model.
Table 18 examines unscheduled option grants in firms around the grant date of a 
patent. The format of Table 18 is similar to that of Table 16, except that the measures of 
informed option exercises are replaced by the measure of unscheduled option grants. 
Using Equation (10), Panel 18.1 and 18.2 show the coefficient estimates and p-values of 
the regressions of the measure of option grants in “influential patent” firms and control 
firms. Panel 18.3 displays the coefficient estimates and p-values from the regressions 
using Equation (11).
The results in Table 18 show a firm is more likely to grant stock options when it 
is larger, has a higher stock volatility, or has a lower liquidity. In the sample of 
“influential patent” firms (Panel 18.1), the estimated coefficient of the ‘Pre-grant’ 
variable is significantly positive. In contrast, the estimated coefficient o f ‘Pre-grant’ is 
insignificantly negative for the matched control firms (Panel 18.2).
Panel 18.3 provides consistent results using the DID control. The negative 
coefficient of variable “Pre-grant” indicates that firms generally award fewer options 
during the pre-grant period than the post-grant period. However, the significantly positive 
coefficient of the interaction term, Pre-grant* Influential-patent, implies that, firms with 
influential patents award significantly more stock options during the pre-grant period, 
relative to the level during the post-grant period.
The distinct difference between the sample of “influential patent” and control 
firms indicates that firms grant significantly more stock options over the one-year pre­
grant period than over the post-grant period when they expect an influential patent being 
granted. This finding discovers that firms award more unscheduled stock options before 
the grant news of an influential patent to maximize executives’ stock option 
compensation, given the expectation of the appreciation of stock price afterward.
Table 18
Regressions o f Unscheduled Option Grants
Independent Variables
8.1 “Influential patent” firms 8.2 ”No-influential patent” firms 8.3 Difference in differences
Dependent variables Dependent variables Dependent variables
#underlying-
shares
#underlying-
shares
#underlying-
shares
#underlying-
shares
#underlying-
shares
#underlying-
shares
Pre-grant 67.48 88.61* -51.66 -17.19 -51.66 -17.69
(0.159) (0.065) (0.305) (0.700) (0.305) (0.706)
Influential-patent -28.85 -74.13
(0.589) (0.126)
Pre-grant ’"Influential-patent 119.13* 111.86*
(0.087) (0.096)
Ln(market cap) 119.04*** 138.17*** 123.64***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
o 9451.21*** 8140.10*** 8809.41***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PRET(-l) 7.71 -30.83 -7.35
(0.796) (0.100) (0.723)
B/M decile 11.47 29.03 16.47
(0.250) (0.191) (0.122)
R&D/Sales -0.07** 1.24*** -0.00
(0.050) (0.000) (0.981)
Liquidity -2673.82* -1922.04 -2116.34*
(0.057) (0.592) (0.078)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N 1306 1288 1306 1289 2612 2577
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.105 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.075
Table 18 (Continued)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of the measure o f executives’ unscheduled option grants on several explanatory variables. The 
sample o f “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential patents filed during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent 
most cited patents of the application year in its 3-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I exclude those top ten percent most cited 
patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those 
influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample of “no-influential patent” firms is the industry-year-size-performance 
matched control sample. The pool for the control sample consists of firms with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value of citation o f its 
technology class in the application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any 
influential patent in the sample period. For each “influential patent” firm, I identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit primary 
SIC code, an absolute percentage difference of market capitalization less than ten percent, and the minimum difference of prior-year returns in the same year. A 
firm in the matched sample may apply for multiple patents in the matched year. To construct the sample of “no-influential patent”, one patent with the lowest 
value of citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event. All firms in the two samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. An option award is 
categorized as unscheduled if it does not occur within one day o f the one-year anniversary o f the prior year’s award date. Firms’ unscheduled option awards are 
measured during two periods for each firm-event: One is the informed period, one-year before a patent’s grant date; the other is the control period, one-year 
period after a patent is granted. The dependable variable is #underlying-shares (number of underlying shares granted to executives in thousands during a year). 
All insiders’ option grants data is from Thomson Insiders Filings database. Market cap is computed as the number of common shares outstanding times the share 
price as of the last calendar year ending prior to the beginning of the informed or control period. The standard deviation of stock returns (a) is calculated over 
trading days (-1, -365) relative to the beginning o f the informed or control period. PRET (-1) is the buy-and-hold return for a firm over trading days (-1, -365) 
relative to the beginning of the informed or control period. B/M decile is assigned as one to ten depending on the firm’s B/M ratio. I use NYSE B/M decile 
breakpoints to assign a firm’s B/M decile. B/M is calculated as book value of equity divided by market value o f equity ratio as of the last calendar year ending 
prior to the informed or control period. R&D/Sales ratio is R&D expense to sales revenue for the last fiscal year ending prior to the informed or control period. 
Liquidity equals to the mean daily trading volume divided by share outstanding during one year prior to the informed or control period. “Pre-grant” is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the executives’ unscheduled option grants occurs during the informed period and equal to zero otherwise. “Influential-patent” is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm has an influential patent filed and equal to zero otherwise. Test statistics are calculated using robust variance. The p-values are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Summary and Conclusions
This study empirically examines whether the exercising and awarding of 
executive stock options are relevant to superior information about the quality of a firm’s 
patents, especially for informed option exercises and unscheduled option grants. Focusing 
on 654 firm-events with an influential patent filed, I analyze executives’ option-related 
behavior around the filing or granting date of an influential patent during the period 
1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited of the 
application year for the three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO 
classification. To compare executives’ abnormal option transaction behavior and assess 
abnormal performance, I construct a matched sample according to industry, year, size, 
and prior firm performance.
In difference-in-differences regressions of two measures of option exercises, I 
find that executives significantly delay exercising their stock options by reducing option 
exercises in the year before application of an influential patent and increasing option 
exercises after that. I find no such pattern of informed option exercises in the matched 
control sample.
I further document that firms award significantly more unscheduled stock options 
to their executives over the year before an influential patent is granted than over the year 
after that, but the control firms award fewer unscheduled stock options before a non- 
influential patent is granted than after that.
My findings support the hypothesis that managers have a strong informational 
advantage in discriminating the quality of patents during the whole process of patent 
activity, from before the application to the grant of a patent. In addition to exercising
options opportunistically, influencing the timing of unscheduled option grants is another 
channel through which insiders can pursue personal gains by exploiting this 
informational advantage.
CHAPTER THREE
CONCLUSIONS
It has been broadly documented that insiders exploit information advantages to 
earn abnormal returns from trading in the securities of their firms prior to major corporate 
events. This study extensively investigates whether insiders pursue personal interests by 
using private information about the quality of the firm’s innovation output, represented 
by the application and grant of an influential patent. Chapter One focuses on insiders’ 
open market trading before the filing year of an influential patent, while Chapter Two 
concentrates on informed executive stock option (ESO) exercises and unscheduled option 
awards before the filing or grant date of an influential patent. In both chapters, influential 
patents are identified as those top ten-percent most cited of the application year for the 
three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification.
In Chapter One, I first document that the market reacts more favorably when an 
influential patent is granted than when an inconsequential patent is granted. I then present 
that post-application long-run abnormal returns for the sample firms with influential 
patents are significantly higher than two control samples. Next, I investigate purchases, 
sales, and net purchases of three groups of insiders, using three measures of the level of 
insider trading and controlling for factors related to insider trading.
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I find that insiders in “influential patent” firms reduce their purchases in the pre­
application year, though not significantly, relative to their trading level during the 
application year. Nevertheless, their net purchases are significantly higher for the same 
period due to the significantly larger reductions in their sales. This pattern of passive 
trading holds true for each insider group and for each of three measures of insider trading. 
I find no such significantly consistent pattern in two control samples.
In Chapter Two, I examine executives’ informed stock option exercises and 
unscheduled option grants before the filing or grant date of an influential patent. To 
compare executives’ abnormal option transaction behavior and assess abnormal 
performance, I construct a matched sample according to industry, year, size, and prior 
firm performance. Informed ESO exercises are identified as those exercised not within 30 
days after the vesting date, not within 30 days before the maturity date, not within 30 
days before the ex-dividend date, and those underlying shares not held in the executives’ 
portfolio following the exercise. I categorize an option award as unscheduled if it does 
not occur within one day of the one-year anniversary of the prior year’s award date.
In difference-in-differences regressions of two measures of option exercises, I 
find that executives significantly delay exercising their stock options by reducing option 
exercises in the year prior to the application of an influential patent and increasing option 
exercises after that. I find no such pattern of informed option exercises in the matched 
control sample.
I further document that firms award significantly more unscheduled stock options 
to their executives in the year before the grant of an influential patent than in the year
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after that. However, the control firms award fewer unscheduled stock options before a 
non-influential patent is granted than after that.
My findings support the hypothesis that managers have a strong informational 
advantage in discriminating the quality of a patent during the lengthy process of patent 
activity, from preparing application to granting of a patent. In addition to insiders’ open 
market trading, exercising ESOs opportunistically and influencing the timing of 
unscheduled option grants are other important channels through which insiders can 
pursue personal interests by exploiting this informational advantage.
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